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Many articles have lately been written about the great increase
in licensing laws in the various states,' some of them taking the
position that such laws are unnecessary, 2 even harmful,3 and one
writer judging them to be evidence of a return to a sort of guild
system.4 This paper is an attempt at investigating licensing laws
as they apply to the building industry, in the hope of drawing
some conclusions as to their effect on the economy of that in-
dustry. The investigation starts from an assumption that the
mere fact that licensing statutes are numerous is not necessarily
t Assistant Professor of Law, Montana State University.
1. Fellman, A Case Study in Administrative Law-The Regulation of
Barbers, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 213 (1941); Graves, Professional and Occupa-
tional Restrictions, 13 TE.iP. L.Q. 334 (1939); Hanft and Hamrick,
Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REV. 1
(1938); MacChesney, Regulation of the Personnel of Business, 58 Aml. L.
REV. 1 (1924); Mitchell, Administrative Discretion to Revoke Licenses,
18 AusT. L.J. 130 (1944); Russ, Many Tradesmen Required to Procure
License Before Practicing Their Craft, 69 ALBANY L. J. 280 (1907);
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Procedural Due Process in Occupational License Cases-Revocation of
License, 20 NEB. L. REv. 24 (1941).
2. Fellman, A Case Study in Administrative Law-The Regulation of
Barbers, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 213 (1941; Silverman, Bennett, Lechliter,
Control By Licensing Over Entry Into the Market, 8 LAW & CONTEIP.
PRoB. 234, 239, 240 (1941).
3. Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 1, at 1.
4. DELANCY, THE LICENSING OF PROFESSIONS IN WEST VIRGINA 155
(1938).
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an objection to them, and the fact that they sometimes apply to
the humbler callings does not automatically indicate their ab-
surdity.
The statutes to be discussed are those having a regulatory, as
distinguished from a taxing, function, although it is recognized
that the regulatory statutes usually include an incidental tax.
The distinguishing mark of such regulatory statutes is the
inclusion of conditions to the acquisition of a license other than
the mere payment of a fee. To some extent this distinction is
arbitrary, since the payment of a fee of any size may be a sub-
stantial restriction upon entry into the trade, and in that sense
be regulatory, but it is usually enacted for other purposes, and
raises other problems. On the other hand some of the regulatory
statutes may have incidental revenue-collecting purposes.5
I. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY
It is a starting point for any discussion of this industry to
,mention the great changes in technique which have occurred
within the last fifty years, changes chiefly in tools and materials.,
Examples of these changes are the use of concrete and structural
steel, the use of machines of all kinds, the greatly increased
speed of building due to machines and to greater specializa-
tion, and the practice of delivering materials to the job in a con-
dition ready for installation without further work. The effect
of most of these changes on the building trades has been greater
specialization, together with less of a demand for skill. As the
range of activities which a carpenter, mason or painter must
engage in is narrowed, and his work is done more with machines,
the demands on his skill are less. Nevertheless, compared with
workers in manufacturing industries, many of the building
trades still require relatively skilled performance. The differ-
ence between 1950 and 1900 in the degree of skill required seems
5. Becker v. Pickersgill, 150 N.J.L. 51, 143 At. 859 (1928) involved a
statute which the court said was both a regulation and a taxing measure.
There is authority to the effect that the two functions cannot be combined
in one statute, and that the measure will be unconstitutional if the fee
imposed is more than enough to cover the costs of regulation. City of
Shawnee v. Reid Bros. Plumbing Co., 201 Okla. 592, 207 P.2d 779 (1949); 9
MCQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 72-77 (3rd ed. 1950). The practical
effect of this doctrine is greatly diminished by the difficulty of proving that
the fee is grossly disproportionate to the sum required to pay the cost of
regulation. A fee of $25 was upheld in State ex rel. Remick v. Clousing,
205 Minn. 296, 285 N.W. 711 (1939).
6. HABER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY 1-48 (1930).
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to be that the requirements in 1950 can be met by a much shorter
period of training.
Another well known and important fact about this industry is
its extreme variation in employment, the obvious reason for
which is the seasonal character of the work. Other causes for
this variation, however, are to be found in the customs of the
industry and in the fact that buildings are usually rented in
October or May, which practice increases the pressure to build
just prior to those months. Also important in producing this
effect are the frequent changes of jobs, which are due to the fact
that most of the construction work is done by many sub-contrac-
tors who hire the men for a particular job and then let them go.7
In recent years, the general result of the interaction of those
factors has been that during the winter months many men have
been unemployed, while during the spring and summer the de-
mand for labor exceeds the supply.8 This, of course, has a strong
tendency to force up the hourly wage, since the men must be
paid enough for about nine months of work to support them
all year. Under these circumstances the hourly wage is not a
good clue to the total yearly income.
The method of entry into the building trades as a workman,
or a contractor, is closely connected with the licensing of the
trades, and should be described in some detail to provide a basis
for understanding the licensing statutes. During the nineteenth
century a man became a skilled carpenter or mason by working
for a contractor as a messenger boy, doing odd jobs or running
errands, picking up his skill and knowledge as best he could9
As the industry became more specialized and more machines
were used, there was less and less need for boys to do this kind
of work, and therefore fewer were being trained. The shortage
of skilled workmen first became acute following World War 1.
It was recognized that contractors had little need for untrained
men to work as apprentices, and that they were reluctant to
take on such men when it was probable that the men would not
7. Id. at 95-126; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 967, EMPLOY-
MENT OUTLOOK IN THE BUILDING TRADES, pp. 14-20 (1949).
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 967, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK
IN THE BUILDING TRADES, pp. 16-17 (1949). The extent of seasonal or
periodic unemployment of course varies with the individual trade, the
special trades (electricians, plumbers) suffering the least from this diffi-
,culty.
9. HABER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 131.
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stay on, since they felt they were training someone else's labor
supply. It was also recognized that the unions had a legitimate
interest in keeping up the skills of their members, although ac-
cusations have been made that this interest has been so applied
as to restrict the labor supply.10 An impersonal element in the
situation was the effect of specialization which prevented an
apprentice from getting, a complete training in any one of the
traditional trades, which is merely another way of saying that
the broad definition of the trades which had evolved in simpler
times was no longer appropriate. 1
As a result of the labor shortage, a systematic method of
apprenticeship was developed in the 1920's, to provide skilled
men in the building trades. This was done through the formation
of joint labor and management committees, both local and na-
tional, for the organization and supervision of apprenticeship
and training. 2 The committees agreed upon the terms of the
apprenticeship contract, the length of the apprenticeship, the
training to be given, the wage to be paid, and all other details of
the program. Often school training was made a part of the ap-
prenticeship program. In many states there are statutes govern-
ing apprenticeship and the apprenticeship contract. 3 The local
and national committees which operate this program are com-
posed of representatives of trade unions and employers' organi-
zations.
A typical, well-organized apprentice program exists in the
electrical industry, under the national sponsorship of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the National
Electrical Contractors Association. 14 The standards of training
are broadly established by the national organizations, with the
local committees filling in the details. In general the require-
ments are that the apprentice be at least eighteen years old, and
not over twenty-four, preferably with a high school education,
that he must be an apprentice for five years, that he must be
10. Id. at 133.
11. Id. at 135.
12. Id. at 139. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 967, EMPLOY-
AMNT OUTLOOK IN THE BUILDING TRADES, p. 38 (1949); U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 459, APPREN-
TICESHIP IN BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, p. 2 (1928).
13. E.g., GEN. STAT. N.C. §§ 94-1 to 94-11 (1950); WIS. STAT. §§ 106.01,
106.02 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 23, §§ liE-11L (1944).
14. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF APPRENTICESHIP, NATIONAL




paid from 25% to 50% of the journeyman's wage, and that he
should be examined from time to time. The apprentice signs an
agreement with the local apprenticeship committee, and also with
the employer to whom he is assigned for training. Both work
and class-room instruction are given, on subjects covering a
rather broad range suggested by the national organizations. The
local committees are responsible for transferring the apprentice
from one employer to another when one is unable to give the
necessary diversity of experience. The ratio between the num-
ber of apprentices and the number of journeymen, which is the
method of limiting the apprentices admitted to the trade, is left
to collective bargaining.
Of course some young men still are trained in nonunion ap-
prenticeships. The difficulties with this are that the protection
of the standard indenture contract is not given, their training
may be less thorough, and they may have no assurance of ad-
mission to the union when their training is completed.
The usual way of becoming a contractor is through the trade
itself, since actual building experience is necessary for super-
vision, unless the contractor has an engineer's training, so that
many contractors are ex-journeymen. 1 Thus to a large extent
the number of contractors is potentially limited by the number
of apprentices and journeymen.
On the employer's side, this industry also exhibits many
problems. Although there are some large contracting firms,
much of the nation's construction work is done by the small or
moderate-sized general contractor, who makes a basic contract
with the owner of the premises, and then subcontracts various
specialized parts of the work, such as the plumbing, the paint-
ing, or the electrical work-." The amount of the work actually
done by the general contractor's organization varies all the way
from almost none, in the case of those contractors acting brokers
for the job, to substantially the entire job, in the case of the
large construction companies. In purchasing materials, schedul-
ing deliveries, and planning the stages of construction the large
firms are efficient, but it is easy to see how the smaller general
contractor would be less efficient.' 7 The subcontractor is even
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 967, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK
IN THE BUILDING TRADES, pp. 24-25 (1949).
16. Id. at 4-8.
17. HABER, op. cit. smpra note 6, at 57, 58.
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more likely to be a relatively small operator, although here again
there are some large firms in the business. 8
The methods of competition in the industry are such that
even a large, competently staffed contractor has some difficulty
in operating efficiently, while the small individual or firm has
an almost impossible task. As is well known, the usual practice,
for building of any importance, is to have an architect prepare
plans and specifications, on the basis of which bids are invited
from contractors. 9 A small contractor is then faced with the
problem of estimating how much his own part of the work will
cost, and with getting sub-bids from subcontractors. Since no
one job is like another, the estimating may be more guess than
calculation and is in large part guessing at second hand, as it is
based upon the guesses of the prospective subcontractors.
Further uncertainty is provided by the fact that the bid is in
effect a short sale, because the contractor is making a present bid
to supply materials and labor which he will have to buy in the
future, at which time their cost may have changed substantially.O
In recent years apparently the only change possible is upward.
The effect of this uncertainty is to cause contractors to shade
their bids optimistically in order to get the job, and then, when
it later appears that costs will be higher than anticipated, to cut
corners in various ways. Of course all contractors do not do
this, but the temptation is strong, some of the less scrupulous or
less well financed contractors do yield, and the result is cheating,
violation of specifications, or impairment of the quality of the
work.21 It is this problem which is often stated as the reason
for the passage of licensing statutes.
II. THE PATTERN OF LICENSING STATUTES
The licensing statutes can be generally classified in two
ways: (1) according to the trades licensed, or (2) by method
of licensing used. The trades licensed, in order of frequency in
which statutes are found, are plumbers, electricians, contractors,
and a few rare ones such as tile setters, masons, public works
contractors, septic tank cleaners, steamfitters, and well drillers.
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOr, BULL. No. 967, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK
IN THE BUILDING TRADES, p. 6 (1949).
19. HADER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 68, 69.
20. Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 72.
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Many of these businesses of course are not usually considered
building trades, but the work done seems sufficiently similar to
or connected with construction to justify including them.
The methods of licensing are two, with some minor variations.
One is by state-wide statute, usually administered by a state
administrative agency. The other is by municipal ordinance,
pursuant to explicit statutory authority, administered either by
a special municipal agency, or by one of the established branches
of the municipal government.
As is shown by Appendix I, 38 states and the District of
Columbia now require licenses of plumbers, 20 of these states
doing so through the passage of municipal ordinances, 21 if the
District of Columbia law is classed as a municipal ordinance.
Eighteen states require electricians to have licenses, and of
these the licensing is handled municipally in eight states. Fifteen
states have laws providing for the licensing of contractors.
In compiling these figures, only those states having explicit
statutes authorizing municipalities to require licenses were tabu-
lated, so that it is possible that the figures for municipal licensing
are too low, if the licensing is done under a general charter
which makes no specific reference to licensing laws. The writer
had no ready means of determining how many cities do require
licenses pursuant to such general charters, and therefore the
figures may be inaccurate to that extent.22
III. LICENSING OF PLUMBERS
The plumbing licensing statutes vary considerably, as is only
natural, among the states. Nevertheless, it is possible to discover
a general form which the statutory scheme approximately
follows. To outline it summarily, this form consists in the appli-
cation for license to a specified board, the qualification to the
satisfaction of the board, usually by examination, and the issu-
ance of the license. The legislation also provides that working
as a plumber without a license is a misdemeanor. Licenses are
renewable annually without further examination.
Before discussing the statutes in detail, it should be said that
22. For example, cities in Washington apparently license plumbers under
their general powers. Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930)
holds a city ordinance constitutional, but cites no statute giving the city
authority to pass such an ordinance, and a thorough search of the present
Washington code has not revealed any statute. However, there was such a
statute at one time, WAsH. LAWS 1905, c. 66, p. 126.
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the overwhelming majority of cases have held that regulation of
plumbing by licensing those who engage in it is a valid exercise
of the police power.23 This trade was the earliest to be regulated
in this way, the first statute being passed in 1885,24 and there
seem to be only two cases which have held that licensing is not a
valid method of regulation, 2 1 one of those having been over-
ruled.26 This leaves only the case of Replogle v. Little Rock,27
holding that a state or municipality cannot constitutionally re-
quire some test of competency and a license as a prerequisite to
doing business as a plumber, although even there it is not en-
tirely clear that the case might not have gone the other way if
the statute had been drafted differently. The Arkansas statute
had given cities of the first and second classes the authority to
license plumbers, after examining them through a board consist-
ing of two licensed master plumbers and two licensed journey-
men.2 8 This board was authorized to examine all applicants as to
23. Marcet v. Board of Plumbers Examination and Registration of
Alabama, 249 Ala. 48, 29 So.2d 333 (1947); State ex Tel. Shirley v. Lutz,
226 Ala. 497, 147 So. 429 (1933); Board of Examiners v. Marchese, 49
Ariz. 350, 66 P.2d 1035 (1937) ; Aarol v. Crosby, 48 Cal. App. 422, 192 Pac.
97 (1920); Douglas v. People ex Tel. Ruddy, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N.E. 341
(1907) ; State v. Malory, 168 La. 742, 123 So. 310 (1929) ; Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 225 Mass. 192, 114 N.E. 287 (1916); Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo.
111, 132 S.W. 607 (1910); People ex Tel. Stepski v. Hartford, 286 N.Y.
477, 36 N.E.2d 670 (1941); Siegnious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91
(1936); People ex Tel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N.Y.
529, 39 N.E. 686 (1895); Roach v. Druham, 204 N.C. 587, 169 S.E. 149
(1933); State ex Tel. Bismarck v. District Court, 64 N.D. 399, 253 N.W.
744 (1934); Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 156 Pa. Super. 520, 40 A.2d 902
(1945); State ex Tel. Grantham v. Memphis, 151 Tenn. 1, 266 S.W. 1038
(1924) ; Ex parte George, 152 Tex. Crim. App. 465, 215 S.W.2d 170 (1948);
Trewitt v. City of Dallas, 242 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Cir. App. 1922); Rountree
Corp. v. Richmond, 188 Va. 701, 51 S.E.2d 256 (1949); Tacoma v. Fox, 158
Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930); State ex Tel. Winkler v. Benzenburg, 101
Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345 (1898); FREUnD, THE PoLIcE PowER §§ 639, 640,
646 (1904).
24. Cal. Stat. 1885, p. 12.
25. State ex Tel. Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 Pac. 851 (1906);
Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S.W. 353 (1924).
26. State ex. Tel. Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 Pac. 851 (1906) has
been expressly overruled by Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac.
1010 (1930), although the latter case says that the Richey case had been
overruled by intervening cases, citing a case which upheld the licensing of
barbers, and.remarking with delightful judicial savoir faire that a plumber
can do more harm than a barber.
27. 166 Ark. 617, 267 S.W. 353 (1924).
28. The statute involved was apparently quite similar to the present
legislation, ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3701 to 3714 (1947), -which was
passed in 1925, except that the membership of the board of examiners has
been changed by adding two city officials. It seems that the state legislature
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss4/1
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plumbing, house drainage, and ventilation and, if satisfied of their
competency, to issue the necessary certificate. The city of Little
Rock passed an implementing ordinance, and the plaintiff sued
to enjoin enforcement of both statute and ordinance as unconsti-
tutional. The court seems to have upheld this contention on two
alternate grounds, though they were not stated alternately: (1)
The legislation was outside the police power, since it did not
have any relation to the protection of public health. (2) It gave
the board of examiners the power to set "theoretical" examina-
tions which no applicant could pass even if he were an accom-
plished practical plumber, and "The personal rights guaranteed
by our State and Federal Constitutions cannot be taken away
on theories. '" In effect the court seems to be saying that the
board had arbitrary power, and that therefore the statute was an
instrument of monopoly which could be used to exclude honest
workmen from their trade. As a matter of statutory construction
it would seem that the court's position was highly doubtful, since
it would not require much interpolation to read the examination
requirement in the light of the statute's purpose to mean only
that a reasonably fair test of the applicant's plumbing prowess
could be given. It is curious that the court did not rely on the
composition of the board to support its assertion that the statute
would confer a monopoly on those already in the trade.
The earlier Washington case, State ex rel. Richey v. Smith,"
is clearer in its rejection of licensing as a method of regulating
plumbing. The court there said, in granting habeas corpus to
release a plumber convicted for working without a license, that
the legislature could not go beyond certain limits in making
rules for the preservation of the health and safety of the com-
munity, and that the licensing statute had no such relation to
public health as would sustain it. Since it was not within the
police power, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. In so holding the court relied heavily on
a vehement dissent by Mr. Justice Peckham in the leading New
York case on this kind of legislation, People v. Warden.3' Al-
though the majority of the New York court held that the licens-
did not take the constitutional doctrine of Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark.
617, 267 S.W. 353 (1924), very seriously.
29. 166 Ark. 617, 627, 267 S.W. 353, (1924).
30. 42 Wash. 237, 84 Pac. 851 (1906).
31. 144 N.Y. 529, 39 N.E. 686 (1895).
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ing of plumbers was a proper exercise of the police power, Mr.
Justice Peckham made the ingenious argument that the examina-
tion had to be either a test of practical plumbing skill, in which
case it would not protect the public health, or a test of knowledge
about sanitation and the science of public health, in which case
the act would be invalid as requiring scientific knowledge which
no mere plumber would be expected to possess. Mr. Justice Peck-
ham went on to say in a vigorous passage:
Taking the act as a whole,... its purpose is to enable the
employing plumbers to create a sort of guild or body among
themselves, into which none is to be permitted to enter ex-
cepting as he may pass an examination, the requisites of
which are not stated, and where his success or failure is to
be determined by a board of which some of their own num-
ber are members .... It is difficult for me to see the least
resemblance to a health regulation in all this.
I think the act is vicious in its purpose and that it tends
directly to the creation and fostering of a monopoly.32
It is worth noting that in both the Richey and the Warden cases
the board was composed of a majority of working plumbers not
connected with the state or local government other than in their
capacities as members of the board.
There have been many other cases, both before and after the
ones discussed, in which the courts have held that plumbing is
the kind of a trade which can be regulated by means of the li-
censing device. 33 These cases usually begin by conceding that the
right of an individual to choose an occupation and work at it is
one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
and by similar provisions of the state constitutions. The mere
statement of this proposition often calls forth eloquence from
the courts, and a Texas court as late as 1922 referred to the
right to work as a "natural right" and a "sacred right."34 In
spite of its natural and sacred attributes, however, the court
had no difficulty in holding that it was subordinate to the "para-
mount, inherent right" of the state to impose reasonable limita-
tions necessary for the public welfare. This court, like many
others, then said that plumbing is related to public health, that
32. Id. at 543, 39 N.E. at 690.
33. See note 22 supra.
34. Trewitt v. City of Dallas, 242 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App., 1922).
Similar language was used in Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo. 111, 132 S.W. 607
(1910), but the court went on to hold that the individual's natural right
must be sacrificed to the good of society.
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it must be done with skill for the safety of the public, and that
therefore it is a proper subject for police regulation.
To ask the courts to decide whether legislation of this kind is
within the state's police power is to ask the impossible. The ulti-
mate issue, as phrased by the authorities, is whether the par-
ticular statute is reasonably appropriate to the protection of
public health or safety.35 Upon analysis this issue can be more
clearly put in the form of two precise questions: (1) Is there
sufficient public danger from faulty plumbing to justify regula-
tion of some sort? (2) Is the licensing method of regulation
effective enough as a means of eliminating this danger to be
within the permissible range of legislative action? Another way
of putting the second question is to ask whether the necessity of
attacking the danger in this way is great enough to overbalance
the desirability of preserving each individual's opportunity to
become engaged in the trade without restriction.
It is not difficult to answer the first question in the affirmative,
since the very prevalence of plumbing codes and similar regula-
tion of the methods of handling water and wastes seems to show
a general agreement among experts that the danger is there.
Furthermore, it would be relatively easy to collect more or less
objective information which would bear out this conclusion,
although the courts seem to assume that such information is not
necessary, and decide the question on the basis of their own
general knowledge of the world, in such general terms as to jus-
tify suspicion that they do not understand the issue. 31
It is the second question which seems unanswerable. The ex-
tent to which the requirement of an examination and license will
reduce the danger from faulty plumbing is certainly beyond the
court's powers of discovery. About all the courts can then do is
what they appear to be doing in the cases, namely, to speculate
35. People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N.Y. 529,
39 N.E. 686 (1895). FREUND, THE POLICE PowER § 492 (1904).
36. People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N.Y. 529,
39 N.E. 686 (1895) merely states, without mention of facts or evidence,
that plumbing is essential to comfort and health. Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo.
111, 132 S.W. 607 (1910), asserts that plumbing is intimately connected
with public health. It need hardly be pointed out that this does not meet
the issue. It is obvious that plumbing is connected with health in the
sense that the human being must have water, and waste must be carried off
in a sanitary way. But the question which ought to be answered is whether
faulty plumbing occurs often enough and is dangerous enough, when it
does happen, to call for regulation.
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that the danger will or will not be lessened. 37 This means that
the outcome will be governed by the courts' general attitude to-
ward legislation. The growth of judicial tolerance toward legis-
lative experimentation in such matters38 has therefore led them
to hold the licensing statutes valid in the absence of reliable in-
formation on the facts. Their reasoning indicates this in its
rather perfunctory statements that plumbing is related to public
health, that licensing is related to plumbing, and that therefore
licensing protects public health and is valid. The result of this
judicial tolerance thus is the relinquishment by the courts to the
legislatures of the balancing of interests, the determination of
complex questions of fact, and the evaluation of methods of con-
trol in this field, to a very great extent. The same tendency is
often stated by the courts themselves in terms of a presumption
that the legislature's action is valid, if a state of facts might
reasonably exist which would justify it. 3 The limits of this pre-
sumption are rather nicely set out by the cases invalidating the
licensing of photographers, 40 but the plumbing cases, and the
electricians' and contractors' cases, appear well within those
limits. Much of the criticism of these statutes fails to recognize
that they present a legislative, rather than a judicial question,
for the most part.
The precise method of regulation used by licensing statutes is
of course not to be overlooked in its influence on the view taken
by courts of the validity of the statute as a whole. It may well
be that a statute could be drafted which would largely reconcile
the conflict of interests present in most such statutes, and as
between individual statutes some are clearly less appropriate
than others to the ends stated. The foregoing account of the
broad issue of the constitutionality of licensing was separated
from the details of specific statutes only for convenience, and also
because of the fact that many details can be held invalid without
invalidating the statute as a whole. In general it is accurate to
37. E.g., Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo. 111, 132 S.W. 607 (1910) (certification
of plumbers is some guaranty of skill and guards against unsafe work);
Douglas v. People ex rel. Ruddy, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N.E. 341 (1907) (licensing
reduces the risk from careless inspection).
38. In the federal court system this attitude is exemplified by Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
39. Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930).
40. This legislation has been held invalid in all states in which it has
been tested. The cases are collected in Note, 7 A.L.R.2d 416 (1949).
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say that the courts are somewhat more meticulous in examining
the method of licensing adopted by a particular statute than
when determining the validity of the system as a whole, although
here again doubts are usually resolved in favor of validity.
This brings the discussion to a more detailed examination of
the existing statutes. The provisions which will be discussed do
not of course appear in all statutes, but they are common enough
to justify looking at them closely in order to judge their efficiency
in accomplishing the supposed purpose of the legislation.
Most licensing statutes classify plumbers in three groups,
master plumbers, journeymen, and apprentices,41 often with a
requirement that apprentices must register.42 Some make no
provision for apprentices.4 3 Master plumbers are those inde-
pendently in business, acting as plumbing contractors.44 The
statutes often require that a master plumber have an established
place of business.4 Journeymen are defined as men competent
to perform the ordinary practical work of plumbing and are dis-
tinguished from master plumbers in that they do not plan, super-
vise or lay out work, do not employ others, and do not engage
in contracting for plumbing work but work for wages.4 6 Another
way of describing masters and journeymen is to call them em-
ployers and employees. 4 7 Apprentices are of course untrained
and inexperienced men learning the trade.4 8
Following the classification of those in the trade many statutes
include a more or less detailed definition of plumbing. The word
41. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 126, § 22 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111
A, § 116.2 (Supp. Oct. 1951); KY. REv. STAT. § 318.010 (1948); ME. REV.
STAT. c. 22, § 171 (1944); N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 51, § 51-3001 (Cum. Supp.
1951); N.D. REV. CODE, § 43-1801 (1943).
42. E.g., WIs. STAT. § 145.08 (1951).
43. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 'V, § 116.1-116.35 (Supp. Oct. 1951).
44. The Wisconsin definition is typical: "A master plumber is any
person skilled in the planning, superintending and the practical installation
of plumbing and familiar with the laws, rules and regulations governing
the same." WIS. STAT. § 145.01 (1951).
45. E.g., TEX. STAT., REV. CIv. art. 6243 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
46. The Maine statute gives the usual definition: "A 'journeyman
plumber' shall mean any person who customarily performs the work of
installing plumbing and drainage under the direction of a master plumber,
or, not being a master plumber as herein defined, does plumbing repair work
as a regular part time occupation." ME. REV. STAT. c. 22, § 171 (1944).
47. Ky. REV. STAT. § 318.010 (1948).
48. "The term 'plumber's apprentice' shall mean any person other than
journeyman or master plumber who is engaged as his principal occupa-
tion in learning and assisting in the installation, alteration, repair and
renovating of plumbing." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3001 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
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is usually defined to cover work on pipes, fixtures and appliances
for the conduction of water and drainage within buildings, and
between buildings and the sewer service laterals and water
mains in the streets, together with work on ventilation systems
connected with water and sewer systems in the building.0  It
thus does not usually cover work on gas piping systems, or on
steam systems, except to the extent that they are part of the
water systems.50 Various kinds of activity not ordinarily done
by plumbers have been held to be within the licensing acts, such
as for example the incidental plumbing necessary to connect
washing machines and sinks to the water system"' and the caulk-
49. The Wisconsin statute is the most detailed: "(1) Plumbing. In this
chapter, 'plumbing' means and includes: (a) All piping, fixtures, appliances
and appurtenances in connection with the water supply and drainage
systems within a building and to a point from three to five feet outside
of the building. (b) The construction and connection of any drain or waste
pipe carrying domestic sewage from a point within three to five feet
outside of the foundation walls of any building with the sewer service
lateral at the curb or other disposal terminal, including private domestic
sewage treatment and disposal systems and the alteration of any such
system, drain or waste pipe, except minor repairs to faucets, valves, pipes,
appliances and removing of stoppages. (c) The water service piping from
a point within 3 to 5 feet outside of the foundation walls of any building
to the mains in the street, alley or other terminal and the connecting of
domestic hot water storage tanks, water softeners, and water heaters
with the water supply system. (d) The water pressure system other than
municipal systems as provided in Chapter 144. (e) A plumbing and
drainage system so designed and vent piping so installed as to keep the
air within the system in free circulation and movement, and to prevent
with a margin of safety unequal air pressures of such force as might
blow, siphon or affect trap seals or retard the discharge from plumbing
fixtures, or permit sewer air to escape into the building." WIS. STAT. §
145.01 (1951).,
50. The New Mexico statute is exceptional in including gas and oil
pipe: "The word 'plumbing' shall mean the installing, altering, repairing
and renovating of all plumbing fixtures, fixture traps, and soil, waste, and
vent pipes with their devices, appurtenances, and connections, through
which water, waste, sewage, gas, oil and air are carried within or adjacent
to the building or other structures in which such plumbing work is being
performed." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3001 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
City of Birmingham v. Allen, 251 Ala. 198, 36 S.2d 297 (1948) held that
installation of short pieces of water pipe in connection with the connec-
tion of gas appliances constituted "plumbing." "Plumbing" was also
held to include the work of steamfitters who tapped a water line in a
factory, led the -water to acid cooling tanks and from there into the
drainage system. Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 156 Pa. Super. 520, 40 A.2d
902 (1945). Commonwealth v. Leswing, 135 Pa. Super. 485, 5 A.2d 809(1939) held that an electrician violated the plumber's licensing statute by
installing and connecting an electric water heater.
51. Rountree Corp. v. Richmond, 188 Va. 701, 51 S.E.2d 256 (1949). (The
defendant, a corporation in the retail furniture business, was held within




ing of joints in sewer pipe.52 On the other hand, many courts
have refused to hold that activities not usually done by plumbers
requires a license. Clearing out drains with a mechanical cut-
ting device, 53 installing hot water heaters,5 repair of boilers,,5
and the installation of water softnersr have all been excluded
from the requirements of licensing acts, but of course the lan-
guage of the statute in question is decisive in determining
whether a given activity is or is not "plumbing."
Licensing statutes provide that anyone engaging in plumbing
must have a license, and impose penalties of various kinds for
working without a license, which is usually classified as a mis-
demeanor. 57 Other sanctions are provided both by statute and
the courts. At least one statute provides that the enforcing
agency may sue to enjoin the unlawfully working plumber.58 It
is also generally held, whether by express statutory authority or
not, that persons unlawfully working without a license may not
recover on contracts made by them in the course of the work,
on the theory that such contracts are illegal and void.5 9 This
52. State v. Foss, 147 Minn. 281, 180 N.W. 104 (1920).
53. State v. Gottstein, 206 Minn. 246, 288 N.W. 221 (1939).
54. Bregman v. Winkler, 120 Misc. 483, 198 N.Y. Supp. 758 (Sup. Ct.
1923); Margolys & Co. v. Goldstein, 96 N.Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
55. People v. Osborne, 149 Misc. 676, 269 N.Y. Supp. 409 (County Ct.
1933); Garrison v. D.C., 30 App. D.C. 515 (1908).
56. State v. Harrington, 229 Iowa 1092, 296 N.W. 221 (1941) is a
strong case, since it held that a requirement that water softeners must be
installed by a licensed plumber was invalid as not being related to public
health. In effect this means that "plumbing" could not constitutionally be
defined so as to include such work. The case is probably not in accord with
the general run of authority.
57. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 2-1406, 2-1408 (1940); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 M,
§ 116.3 (Supp. Oct. 1951); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.455, 14.462 (1937);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 66-2401, 66-2411 (Cum. Supp. 1951); Wis.
STAT. §§ 145.06,145.12 (1951).
58. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 1373 (1950).
59. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1766 (Rev. ed. 1938). Lund v. Bruflat,
159 Wash. 89, 292 Pac. 112 (1930), noted in 26 ILL. L. REV. 347 (1931),
held that there could be no recovery for work done when the plainiff had no
license at the time the contract was made. The plaintiff was not allowed to
foreclose a lien for the work. The difficulty here is that at the time the
contract was made and the work performed the plumbers license law was
unconstitutional, under the Richey case. After the trial in this action the
Richey case was overruled, and this decision therefore gives retroactive
effect to the overruling. It would seem that the plaintiff here should have
been able to rely for his law on the decision of the highest state court.
Barriere v. Depatie, 219 Mass. 33, 106 N.E. 572 (1914) allowed an
unlicensed contractor to recover for work done, where the work was
actually performed by a licensed master plumber and a licensed journeyman,
both employed by the contractor for weekly wages.
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means that a plumber who contracts for work in violation of the
licensing statute will be entirely unable to recover for any work
or materials expended on the job, on either a contract or a quasi-
contract theory of liability. As a sanction this may be much
more severe in many cases than a mere fine for violation of the
statute.
The method of obtaining a license varies considerably but
generally requires a written application and payment of an
examination fee, which varies considerably in amount among
the states. 60 The fee is usually larger for a master than for a
journeyman. It is sometimes held that the fee must be only large
enough to cover the reasonable expenses of examination and li-
censing, but the cases are not in agreement on the point.61 The
application is quite often made on a form supplied by the exam-
ining authority, which requires the usual information such as
name, address, age, place of birth, and many states may require
additional statements concerning the applicant's moral char-
acter.62 The last requirement, however, does not seem to be
general, and communications from some members of administra-
tive boards have indicated that they think it either unnecessary
or undesirable.63 It would seem highly desirable to maintain as
much objectivity in the qualifying process as possible, and there-
fore that there should be no attempt to make a character investi-
gation of the applicant. A finding by the administering board
that the applicant's character is defective in some way and that
60. In Illinois the original master's fee is $25, the journeyman's $15.
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 %, § 116.32 (Supp. Oct. 1951). A master's fee of
$100 under the former statute was held unreasonable and invalid by People
v. Brown, 407 Ill. 562, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950). In Kentucky the corre-
sponding fees are $25 and $5. KY. REv. STAT. § 318.050 (1948). In Maine
they are $15 and $3. ME. REV. STAT. c. 22, § 175, 176 (1944). In New
Hampshire inflation has not yet been felt, the fee being $1 originally, and
$.50 for renewal . N.H. REv. LAWS c. 183, § 5 (1942).
61. See note 5 supra.
62. D.C. CODE tit. 2, § 2-1403 (1940); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 14.458
(1948); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4071.1 (Cune. Supp. 1951); TEX. STAT.,
REV. CIv. art. 6243-101, § 8 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-14-3 (1943).
The New York City Municipal Civil Service Commission makes an investi-
gation of the applicant's "moral standing in the community," although
that does not seem to be required by the New York City Administrative
Code. Letter dated November 27, 1951 from the Director, Examining
Division, New York Municipal Civil Service Commission, to the writer.
See also N.Y. City Administrative Code § 561-1.0, 816-2.0 (1938).
63. Letter from the Illinois Department of Registration and Education
to* the writer, dated Nov. 14, 1951. The letter indicated that a character




he is therefore not eligible for a license can hardly be reviewed
by a court and may too easily become the means of making biased
or unfriendly exclusions or of arbitrarily limiting the numbers
to be admitted to the trade.
One requirement which is found in many states is that of
a stated number of years of experience, without which the appli-
cant is not allowed to take the examination. For instance in
Wisconsin, under the regulations of the State Board of Health,
a five-year apprenticeship must be served before the apprentice
can take the examination for journeyman, and the journeyman
must work as such for five years before being able to take the
master's examination, except that if the journeyman is a gradu-
ate of a recognized trade school in Wisconsin, with two years'
practical experience as apprentice, he may take the examinations
after only four years as a journeyman. 64 In Colorado the appren-
ticeship requirement is three years, and the applicant must work
as a journeyman for one additional year before being able to
take the master's examination.65 Under the statute in force in
Illinois until 1951 the elapsed time required for becoming a mas-
ter was from ten to eleven years, depending on whether the man
had credit for college work. 6 One cannot help looking with some
skepticism on such statutes, when the equivalent time for be-
coming eligible to take examinations for the legal profession
varies between five and seven years, and for the medical pro-
fession is approximately nine years, taking the regular four year
college course into account. There is a strong temptation to sus-
pect that the explanation for excessive training requirements is
not that more knowledge and experience is required to handle
a plumbing job than to perform an appendectomy, but rather
that the members of the plumbing trade are anxious to restrict
the entry of competitors into their business. At any rate the
Illinois court has held that this section of the Illinois statute is
unconstitutional, as imposing requirements which are not in
accord with the realities of the trade.67 Other cases have ap-
64. Wis. Stat. §§ 145.02, (1951) (4); Rules of the Wis. Board of Health,
Bureau of Plumbing and Sanitary Engineering, § 6, § 9 (9th ex., 1948).
65. CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 126, § 4 (1935); Colo. State Plumbing Code Art.
XIX, § 143 (April 9, 1951).
66. People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950).
67. Id. at 580, 95 N.E.2d at 896. The court found that the minimum time
for getting instruction was not in accord with the realities of the trade, in
view of the fact that plumbing is not a profession.
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proved long training periods."8 The presence of such unreason-
able requirements in the statute would lend some support to the
statement of Mr. Justice Peckham in the Warden case. 0 If, as
seems to be the case, many states can protect the public health
without any time-of-service requirement, it is hard to see why
such very long periods are necessary for that purpose. In sup-
port of this argument is the statement of the Public Health En-
gineer for the Colorado Department of Public Health to the effect
that an investigation of examination results in that state showed
no relation between the length of apprenticeship time and the
grades acquired.70 It would also seem undeniable that such long
periods of required training discourage good men from entering
the trade, especially when today it is possible to earn good wages
in other industries with relatively little training. 1'
A recent Illinois case, People v. Brown,72 raises some interest-
ing questions about the training and experience requirements of
these statutes. In reversing a conviction for working as a master
plumber without a license, and holding three sections of the
former Illinois statute unconstitutional, the court relied chiefly
on the restrictive and monopolistic pattern of training imposed
by the statute. Under it a man could learn the trade as an ap-
prentice, or work as a journeyman plumber only when employed
by, and under the direct supervision of, a licensed master
68. Benedetto v. Kern, 167 Misc. 831, 4 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
aff'd moem., 255 App. Div. 753 7 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dept. 1938), aff'd m em.,
279 N.Y. 798, 19 N.E.2d 92 ?1939). The court here said that the require-
ment of the New York City administrative code, pursuant to the state
statute, of ten years of experience, or, in the alternative, of three years plus
an engineering degree from an approved school, before a man could become
a master plumber, was not so unreasonable or arbitrary as to be an un-
warranted interference with constitutional rights. The requirement of five
years as a journeyman was upheld in People ex rel. Stepski v. Hartford,
286 N.Y. 477, 36 N.E.2d 670 (1941). On the other hand there is a dictum
in Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 225 Mass. 192, 114 N.E. 287 (1916) to the
effect that the board's requirement of three years' experience as a journey-
man was invalid, but on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds.
69. People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N.Y. 529,
39 N.E. 686 (1895).
70. Letter from the Public Health Engineer of the Colorado Department
of Public Health to the writer, dated Nov. 16, 1951, saying that the time
requirement for journeyman applicants was reduced from five years to
three years, and that ". . . investigation of the examination results has
disclosed that there is no relation between apprencticeship time and grades
acquired."
71. HABER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 131, 132.
72. 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950). See also Sioux Falls v. Kadinger,
50 N.W.2d 797 (S.D. 1951).
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plumber. The court made three points in this connection: (1)
This gave master plumbers a complete and arbitrary control
over the entry of new men into the trade, since the masters had
unlimited power to hire and fire whom they pleased. (2) The
monopoly on instruction given to masters was unreasonable be-
cause the trade could be learned at school as well as when work-
ing for a licensed master. (3) The requirement of the employ-
ment relation between masters and all others in the trade had
no relation to the purposes of the act. The first two points seem
entirely valid and raise real objections. The third is of less im-
portance, practically, since the requirement that a licensed mas-
ter plumber supervise all jobs is probably unobjectionable, and
in most cases the licensed master plumber will be the employer.
Therefore the employment relation will generally exist between
master plumbers on the one hand, and journeymen and appren-
tices on the other, except where the employer is a corporation.
So long as the act provides for supervision by master plumbers,
the elimination of the provision that journeymen and apprentices
must be employed by master plumbers is thus of little practical
benefit. The court does not go so far as to hold that the require-
ment of supervision is invalid.73
The decision in the Brown case emphatically rejected the
highly anti-competitive scheme of control over the plumbing
trade set up by the Illinois act, thereby making it plain that
there are some constitutional limits to the use of the licensing
power in this field, and for this the court is to be congratulated.
There is some evidence that this scheme of control had been
quite effective in preventing the entry of new firms and indi-
viduals into the business,74 so that the case ought to have a bene-
73. Ex parte Davis, 118 Ore. 693, 247 Pac. 809 (1926) supports the Brown
case in holding that the requirement of an employer-employee relation had
no relevance to the purposes of the statute. It said that it would be valid
to require supervision by a master plumber, but that there is no need for
the journeyman to be paid by the master who supervises him.
A Michigan case, Hench v. Michigan State Plumbing Board, 289 Mich.
108, 286 N.W. 176 (1939), goes so far as to say in a dictum that the re-
quirement of supervision by a master is superfluous and invalid where
journeymen are also licensed, the licensing of all plumbers being enough to
protect public health.
74. A letter from the Plumbing Division, Department of Registration
and Education of Illinois to the writer, dated Nov. 14, 1951, stated that
the average number of persons licensed as master plumbers per year during
the period from 1935 to the date of the decision in People v. Brown was
only forty-four. The same letter states that the mortality rate of master
plumbers during this period was one hundred and one per year. Thus ap-
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ficial effect on the building industry. Unfortunately, other parts
of the opinion leave considerable doubt about the extent to which
the statute was invalid. For instance, the court seemed to say7r
that any minimum requirements for training would be invalid,
because they do not take account of differences in the capacities
of individuals to learn the trade. What the court probably meant
here was that the periods in the statute were so long that many
persons could become qualified long before the expiration of the
statutory time. Further the court seemed to object to the con-
current existence of two entirely different standards of instruc-
tion, one for Chicago and one for the entire state. Under the
statute8 Chicago was given the authority to examine and license
plumbers, and its license was to be good throughout the state.
Likewise the state license was made good in Chicago. This same
provision is contained in the new statute,77 passed in 1951,
however.
Once the would-be master or journeyman has qualified to
take the examination, his difficulties are still not ended. Some
statutes go to considerable lengths to set out the type of examina-
tion which shall be given,78 but it is probably more common to
find merely a statement that the administering agency shall con-
duct examinations, as in Kentucky ;79 or that the examinations
may be in whole or in part in writing and shall cover both the
theoretical and practical nature of plumbing, as in Maine8o
Since many of the agencies which administer the examinations
have been given the rule-making power by statute, advance
notice of the nature of the examinations may sometimes be ob-
tained from the agency's regulations, as in Colorado. The Colo-
rado regulations provide that the examination will consist of
parently the statute operated to reduce the number of individuals in the
business, in the face of a vast expansion in building construction. For an
account of restrictive practices in the building industry in Chicago, see
Hearings before TNEC Subcommittee on Trusts, Investigation of Con-
centration of Economic Power, Hearing 76th Cong., 2d Sess., No. 11, 5251,
5255 (1940).
75. People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 580, 95 N.E.2d 888, 896 (1950).
,76. ILL. RE . STAT. c. 111 1/2, § 103 (1935).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 111 1/2, § 116.8 (Supp. Oct. 1951).
78. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.458 (1937); UTAH CODE ANN. §79-14-4(1943) (very detailed provisions concerning content of examination).
All statutes provide that persons active in the plumbing business at the
time of passage of the licensing act, or sometimes for a specified period
before passage, may be licensed without examination.
79. Ky. Rsv. STAT. § 318.040 (1948).
80. ME. REV. STAT. c. 22, § 177 (1944).
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"written questions, charts, practical lead wiping and estimating
and shall cover the theory, interpretation of charts, blue prints,
the practice of plumbing, and may, in part, be oral."3 1 It is usual
also to have the examination cover the state plumbing code.
82
Some of the cases have restrained what are thought to be
abuses of the examining procedure, by refusing to approve ex-
aminations which cover material beyond the competence of the
ordinary plumber.8 3 Other cases have gone quite far to find that
the legislature has improperly delegated its authority when it
has authorized an administrative board to prepare and supervise
the examination of applicants, without at the same time setting
standards for the examination.8 4 In many of the latter cases it
would appear that the standards for the examination could be
easily inferred from the purposes of the statute, so that it is
hard to see the value of requiring the legislature to spell out
81. Colo. State Plumbing Code, Art. XVIII, § 140 (April 9, 1951).
82. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §51-3008 (1941).
83. U.S. ex rel. Thomas v. Kerr, 5 App. D.C. 241 (1895), held that appli-
cants for a license could not be required to show a thorough knowledge of
the sciences of hygiene and sanitation. The court, at page 252, said, "All
that can lawfully be required of an applicant is that he shall be possessed
of such practical knowledge as that he may be able to understand the
details of the plumbing regulations, to comprehend plans and drawings
for work to be done, and particularly to do the work in a skillful manner,
and to be competent to know when it is so done by a journeyman in his
employ."Scully v. Hallihan, 365 Ill. 185, 6 N.E.2d 176 (1936) held the statute
invalid when it required applicants for a drain layer's license to pass the
plumber's examination, since their trade did not include plumbing, so that
the examination was not reasonably related to the purposes of the statute.
State ex rel. Winkler v. Benzenburg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345 (1898)
approved the Wisconsin examination as requiring only a practical knowl-
edge of plumbing.
84. People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950) held that the
former Illinois statute had failed to include proper standards for the
examination and had failed to impose the requirement of uniform examina-
tions, so that applicants would have no assurance that the examinations
would be on plumbing alone and would be uniform. Of course, unless
the same examination be given each time, it must be conceded that no two
examinations can be uniform, though they may be comparable. The neces-
sary standards of subject matter and uniformity would seem to have been
implicit in the statute here. The recent Illinois statute takes care of this
problem by requiring the Board to "prepare and give uniform examinations
to applicants for licenses as Master Plumbers which will test their qualifica-
tions in the planning and supervision of plumbing and the physical and
mechanical installation, replacement, repair and maintenace of plumbing."
ILL. REV. STAT. c. 111 %, § 116.10 (Supp. Oct., 1951).
Contra: State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365, 52 P.2d 890 (1935), holding there
was no improper delegation, even though the statute contained no standards,
and the only clue to the nature of the examination was the presence of two
plumbers on the examining board!
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elaborate statements of what the examinations are to cover.
Most such statements boil down in the end to a requirement that
a reasonably fair examination on the applicant's knowledge of
plumbing be given.
The statutes do not usually contain any provisions as to what
is to constitute a passing grade, although in Colorado, the Health
Department's regulations say that a grade of 75% is required to
become a journeyman, and a grade of 85% to become a master.,,
In Illinois, passing is 75%, with no question below 60%.88 So
far as the writer has been able to determine, it is by no means
easy to pass the plumbing examination in most states. Appendix
III gives the figures obtained by writing to a number of state
agencies. The proportion of passing grades ranges from a high
of 92% in Illinois to a low of 10% - 15% on the written section
of the New York City examination. The high figure in Illinois
can be explained by the fact that relatively few persons took the
examinations there, perhaps because of the very long training
requirement. Seventy percent seems to be the next highest rate
of passing, and that seems none too high. The remaining figures
down to New York City's appear quite low. The writer has not
been able to find out just how the grading is done, but here again
the small number of passing grades would seem to be some
evidence that the examinations, like the training requirement,
are being used as a means of limiting entry into the trade and
consequent competition.
There are some common minor requirements about examina-
tions which should be mentioned. Where the licensing is state-
wide, statutes often provide for examinations at stated intervals
in different parts of the state.8 7 Notice requirements are pro-
vided, and sometimes the administering agency may give exami-
nations at more frequent intervals.8
It becomes quite clear as one studies the licensing scheme
here that the key to the situation is the agency which admin-
isters the statute. In this respect again the statutes are not
uniform, but there is one element which they all have in common,
and that is that the agency which gives the examinations and
85. Colo. State Plumbing Code Art. XVIII, § 139 (April 9, 1951).
86. Ill. Proposed Rules for the 1951 Plumbing License Law, § II (4).
87. E.g., N.D. Ruv. CODE § 43-1812 (1943).
88. Wis. Rules Governing Plumbing Apprenticeship and Licensing of
Plumbers, adopted by the State Board of Health, Rule 10(a) (1948).
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makes the initial determination on whether a license is to be
granted always contains one or more members of the plumbing
trade, and nearly always those members are in the majority.
Due to the relationship between plumbing regulation and public
health, the state or city board of health is often given ultimate
responsibility for the administration of licensing, but even in
those instances, the examinations are conducted by a board of
examiners made up for the most part of practicing master and
journeyman plumbers.
Examples of the organization of boards of examiners which
are typical occur in Massachusetts, where the board is made up
of one master plumber with ten years' continuous practical ex-
perience, one sanitary engineer, and one journeyman plumber
with ten years' experience who is a wage earner; s9 in Maine
where the board includes the director of the division of sanitary
engineering of the bureau of health, one master plumber, and
one journeyman plumber with two years' experience in the
plumbing business ;') in Wisconsin where the licensing is under
the control of the State Board of Health, but where a committee
of examiners is appointed by that Board, consisting of one em-
ployee of the Board, one master plumber, and one journeyman
plumber, to conduct the examinations. 91 It is more common to
have the boards of examiners appointed by the governor of the
state, or in a city licensing system, by the mayor,93 but in some
cases, as in Wisconsin, Kentucky,94 and Colorado, 95 the Board of
Health makes the appointment.
89. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 13, § 36 (1952).
90. ME. REV. STAT. c. 22, § 172 (1944).
91. WIs. STAT. § 145.03 (1949).
92. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN., § 14.457 (1937) (Governor appoints two
licensed master plumbers and one licensed journeyman, who serve with
two state employees ex officio); MONT. REV. CODES ANN., § 66-2403 (Supp.
1951) (Governor appoints one licensed master, two licensed journeymen, one
member at large representing the public, plus the director of the board
of health's sanitary engineering division); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 51-3003
(Cum. Supp. 1951) (Governor appoints one representative of a water or
gas public service corporation, one representative of the master plumbers,
one representative of a nationally recognized journeymen's organization,
one plumbing inspector from an incorporated municipality, and one repre-
sentative expert in sanitation).
93. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 341.040 (1949); N.H. REv. LAws c. 183, § 3(1942); N.Y. Gen. City Law § 40-a (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2553
(Cum. Supp. 1951).
94. Ky. REv. STAT. § 318.080 (1948).
95. Cow. STAT. ANN. C. 126, § 4 (1935).
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Other methods for appointing these boards which give the
organized members of the trade even more control over adminis-
tration are found in Louisiana and Illinois. In Louisiana the
governor appoints the State Board of Examiners of Journeymen
Plumbers, which consists of the Supervisor of Plumbing of New
Orleans ex officio, and two master and two journeymen plumbers.
The law requires the governor to select the last four from lists
submitted by recognized masters' and journeymen's associa-
tions,96 which means in effect that the employers' trade associa-
tion and the labor union select the Board. The situation is
similar in Illinois, where -the Director of the Department of
Registration and Education appoints the State Board of Plumb-
ing Examiners, consisting of one master plumber, one journey-
man plumber, and one person designated by the Director, but
in doing so he is required to give "due consideration" to recom-
mendations of the Association of\Illinois Master Plumbers, of
the Association of Journeyman Plumbers, and of the Illinois
Retail Hardware Association27 Somewhat similar provisions are
found in New York City.98
On the other hand some ordinances and statutes place the
trade representatives in the minority on the examining boards,
as was the case in Tacoma v. Fox,l9 where the board consisted
of the commissioner of public welfare, the chief plumbing in-
spector, the chief examiner of the civil service commission, to-
gether with one master and one journeyman plumber. A board
of this composition would seem to be less likely to act in accord-
ance with the desires of the group being regulated and more
likely to observe the interests of the general public than one
made up of a majority of those in the trade.00
It is a surprising fact that very few cases have dealt with the
problem whether these licensing statutes, in giving so much
96. LA. REv. STAT. tit. 37, § 1361 (1950).
97. ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 111 %, § 116.9 (Supp. Oct. 1951).
98. New York City Administrative Code, §816-2.0, p. 1134, (1938)
provides that the municipal civil service commission, in the preparation,
conduct and rating of examinations, shall call on the plumbing industry
for assistance, in the form of the services of two licensed master plumbers
and one journeyman. The commission may also call on duly accredited
sanitary engineers or physicians for assistance. The masters and journey-
men are required to be drawn from a panel furnished by the respective trade
and labor organizations.
99. 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930).
100. A board of this kind was held competent and proper in State ez Tel.
Bismarck v. District Court, 64 N.D. 399, 253 N.W. 744 (1934).
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authority to persons in the plumbing business, have invalidly
delegated power to private groups. This contention was raised
in one New York case, Benedetto v. Kern,'0 ' in which the peti-
tioner attacked the New York City Administrative Code provi-
sion allowing industry members to participate in the prepara-
tion, conduct and grading of the examination as "a fascist
method of industrial control.' 0 2 The court's answer was that it
was the civil service commission's examiners, not the industry
representatives, who prepared, conducted, and graded the exami-
nation. The committee of the plumbing industry merely engaged
in general discussions with the examiners as to the technical
qualifications of plumbers, and the court said that this type of
discussion was both natural and desirable. The court's reliance
on the fact that the industry committee did not actually make
final decisions might justify an argument that if it had, the court
might have held the provision invalid, but no such decision has
been found in this field.
The leading case invalidating the delegation of power to pri-
vate groups to make regulations, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
10 3
involved a statute authorizing management and labor in certain
coal mining districts to set minimum wages and maximum hours.
In the famous phrase of the opinion, this was "legislative dele-
gation in its most obnoxious form."'0 4 Yet the delegation in that
case did not contain nearly as great a potentiality for harm to
the minority as the delegation found in the typical licensing
statute. In the Carter Coal case it was reasonably probable that
the interests of all would be protected by the bargaining process
carried on by the two opposed interests of management and
labor. In the licensing statute, however, only one side is gen-
erally represented, the boards being usually composed of a ma-
jority of persons already licensed, and these persons have every
motive for raising the standards for membership and limiting
the number of persons admitted to the craft. To say this is not
to accuse these boards of maladministration. The conflict be-
tween their interests as plumbing contractors or journeymen
101. 167 Misc. 831, 4 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd mem., 255
App. Div. 753, 7 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dept. 1938), aff'd mem., 279 N.Y. 798,
19 N.E.2d 92 (1939).
102. Id. at 837, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
103. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
104. Id. at 311.
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and an impartial judgment on standards of admission to the
trade cannot help but arise, and in the vast majority of these
statutes there is no adequate safeguard for the interests of those
seeking licenses and for the interests of the public.
Professor Jaffe, in his leading article on this general prob-
lem' 05 points out that historically many private groups have
made law, in the sense of making decisions or rules whose ulti-
mate sanction is provided by the state, and that recognition of
this fact makes the recent legislation delegating power to such
groups appear less objectionable. This is quite true, but there
is a clear distinction between the type of delegation to which he
refers and the usual licensing statute. In nearly all the cases
which he discusses, there is provided some machinery for pro-
tecting the interests of the minority, either by representation in
a bargaining procedure, as in the Carter Coal case, or by being
allowed to vote, as in the referenda and local option cases. There
is no such protection in the licensing cases.Professor Jaffee rightly suggests that the standards provided
by these statutes are not adequate protection. This is nowhere
clearer than in the licensing situation, since it is impossible to
prescribe an examining and grading system which could not be
manipulated by the persons operating it if they wished to do so.
The standards actually set out reflect this in their very general
statements of policy10°
As a criterion of validity in this field, Professor Jaffe's article
proposes the requirement of consent by an administrative officer
or agency at some point in the regulatory process. Although the
cases seem to support this, 10 7 it is an empty requirement for our
purposes. If the master plumbers and journeymen, by virtue of
their selection to an examining board, become an administrative
agency of the state, then the delegation would be upheld, even
though they should only work a few days a year and carry on
their private business all the rest of the time. This is hardly a
realistic, guaranty of impartial judgment by the board.
A few cases attack this same problem from a different angle
by holding that a board composed of a majority of persons en-
gaged in the business being regulated is biased, and that its de-
105. Jaffe, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
106. See p. 504 supra.




terminations violate the procedural requirements of due process
for that reason. These cases generally involve price-fixing and
rely on the fact that the boards involved have a direct pecuniary
interest in the matters submitted to them.08 There are cases
both ways on the question. 109 The licensing situation is also
probably distinguishable, because it would be impossible to say
that any member of an examining board would be financially
affected by the grant or denial of a license to a particular person,
although he might very likely be so affected by the board's gen-
eral policy in regard to licenses. Thus the possible bias is not
nearly so clear and pervasive in the licensing cases.
At least a partial solution to the difficulty is given by the
judicial review provisions found in some of the licensing statutes.
Thus under the new Illinois act, all final decisions of the Director
of the Department of Registration and Education, the ultimate
licensing authority, are reviewable by the courts under the state
Administrative Review Act."" The efficacy of judicial review as
a safeguard is limited by the doctrine that the administrative
decision is upheld where supported by substantial evidence. Pre-
sumably the denial of a license would be considered a final deci-
sion which could be reviewed in this way, although it is con-
ceivable that a court might hold that only revocation of an out-
standing license would be reviewable. The New Mexico statute
gives even more protection, by allowing an appeal to the district
court, and a hearing de novo by that court, with the burden of
proof on the party appealing."' So far as appears, an appeal
could be taken from the denial of a license as well as from a
revocation.
Judicial review of course protects against the grosser forms
of abuse, but it is of relatively little value in uncovering and
checking a generally restrictive attitude on the part of a licens-
ing board. Such an attitude may have been adopted consciously
108. Milk Marketing Board v. Johnson, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346
(1940) held a milk control act invalid which set up a board to determine
prices whose members were in the business.
109. The following are contra to Milk Marketing Board v. Johnson, 295
Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940): Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Board, 134
Fla. 1, 13, 183 So. 759, 764 (1938) (pricefixing board in the laundry busi-
ness) ; Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Commission, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d
35 (1950) (a milk control board similar to that in the Johnson case was
approved).
110. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 1/, § 116.28 (Supp. Oct. 1951).
111. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3018 (Cure. Supp. 1951). See also MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 14.461 (1937).
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or unconsciously by the board, but in most cases it could not be
proved by a person whose license application had been denied.
It would be entirely too intangible for that. Yet the possibility
that a board might act in this way would be more harmful to the
public, and to applicants for licenses, than the chance that the
board might favor one applicant over another. The latter chance
is present with any decision-making body and can be pretty well
eliminated by adequate judicial review. The former possibility
affects the community more extensively, though more subtly, and
can only be eliminated by the appointment of persons to examing
boards who have no outside conflicting interests.
The reason usually given for appointing members of the
plumbing trade t6 these boards is that their expert knowledge
and experience is useful, even indispensable, in determining
whether an applicant is qualified to engage in the trade. There
is truth in this, and it is certainly important to have the licens-
ing handled by persons intimately acquainted with the techni-
cal requirements of the business. On the other hand it would
seem that sufficiently qualified persons could usually be found in
the ranks of plumbing inspectors, sanitary engineers and men-
bers of boards of health to supply all the technical experience
necessary, thereby reconciling the demand for an impartial
board with the demand for an expert board.
A few other of the common characteristics of plumbing
licensing statutes may be mentioned. They usually contain
provisions for revocation by the administrative agency, upon
notice, and with an opportunity to the licensee to be heard.112
It is not uncommon to provide that the revocation proceeding
may be' initiated by private persons who must file a written
complaint with the board.113 The grounds for revocation are
various, the common ones being fraud or misrepresentation
112. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 126, § 8 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 12,§ 116.21 (Supp. Oct. 1951); Ky. REv. STAT. § 318.070 (1948); ME. R v.STAT. c. 22, § 182 (1944); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 142, § 6 (1932); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 14.461 (1937); MINN. STAT. § 326.43 (Henderson 1949);
MIoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-2408 (Supp. 1951); NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-309(1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3017 (Cum. Supp. 1951); N.C. GEN. STAT,
ANN. § 87-23 (1950); N.D. REv. CODE § 43-1819 (1943); ORE. CoMxP. LAWS
ANN. § 99-1617 (1940); R.I. Pub. Laws 1945-1946 c. 1661, § 25; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 7172a (Williams 1934); TEX. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 6243-101,(1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-14-9 (1943); WIS. STAT. § 145.10 (1949).
113. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.461 (1937) (board is required to in-
vestigate and hold hearings upon the written complaint of private persons).
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in obtaining the license, 114 wilful violation of statute or plumb-
ing regulations,",5 loaning of license,"16 the wilful employment
of an unlicensed person," 7 and incompetence.:" Judicial review
of revocation is generally provided for." 9 It is common also
to find that the board is authorized to issue another license a year
after the revocation, so that revocation resembles suspension
to some extent.2"0
Where the licensing is done by municipalities, it may have
the effect of limiting the mobility of labor. It easily can be
seen from the general discussion of the construction industry
that mobility of labor is important to the efficiency of the indus-
try, due to the frequent shifting from one job to another which
occurs as one piece of construction is completed and another
begun. If men in the trades are prevented from going into
another city to take a job, local labor shortages may occur
there, while in nearby areas there may be local unemployment.' 21
Nevertheless there are still states in which a license to work
in one city carries no right to work in another.'12 The effect of
114. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 'A, § 116.22 (Supp. Oct. 1951); ME.
REV. STAT. c. 22, § 182 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 43, § 324(1939); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.461 (1937); R.I. Pub. Laws 1945-1946, c.
1661, § 25; TEx STAT., REV. Civ. art. 6243-101 (1948); Wis. STAT. § 145.10
(1949).
115. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 '/, § 116.22 (Supp. Oct. 1951); R.I.
Pub. Laws 1945-1946 c. 1661, § 25; Wis. STAT. § 145.10 (1949) (requires
two wilful violations before there can be revocation). In New Mexico the
violation may be either wilful or negligent to justify revocation. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 51-3017 (Cune. Supp. 1951).
116. E.g., N.D. R-V. CODE § 43-1818 (1943); R.I. Pub. Laws 1945-1946,
c. 1661, 25.
117. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 326.43 (Henderson 1949); R.I. Pub. Laws
1945-1946, c. 1661, § 25.
118. E.g., MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 66-2408 (Supp. 1951); TEX. STAT.
REv. Civ. art. 6243-101 (1948).
119. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 M, § 116.28 (Supp. Oct. 1951); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 14.455 (1937) (appeal de novo to the circuit court in chan-
cery); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3018 (Cum. Supp. 1951) (administrative
appeal from the plumbing engineer to the Plumbing Administrative Board,
and appeal from the Board to the district court, with trial de novo in that
court); R.I. Pub. Laws 1945-1946, c. 1661, §28.
120. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 326.43 (Henderson 1949); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 43-1820 (1943); TEX. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 6243-101 (1948); Wis. STAT.
§ 145.10 (1949).
121. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BULL. No. 967, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK
IN THE BUILDING TRADES (1949) 20 gives as a characteristic of employment
that it is constantly changing, and advises men entering the industry that
they must be prepared to travel considerable distances to work.
122. The outstanding example is New York, where a license to work
as a plumber in one city gives no such right in others. N.Y. Gen. City Law
§ 45 (1951). The Municipal Civil Service Commission's Examining Division,
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this on the labor supply is of course difficult or impossible to
measure, but it would appear to be harmful, and in at least one
state, Rhode Island, was the major reason for the state's shift
from a local to a state-wide method of licensing. 23 The problem
can be, and is, solved to some extent by providing that a license
from one city will entitle the holder to work at his trade in all
other cities of the state, as in Iowa and Missouri.124
A similar but less acute problem exists where the licensing
is state-wide. It may be desirable to have persons in the plumb-
ing trade free to move about from state to state in search of
work, where the employment opportunities are uneven, and
licensing to some extent prevents this. A few states have pro-
vided for reciprocity with other states having comparable licens-
ing laws, such as Maine,125 Wisconsin 2 6 and Illinois.27 Michigan
has attempted to arrange for reciprocity but has been unsuc-
cessful, 2 1 which is at least some indication that the need for it
exists. So long as there are state boundaries there will of course
be differences in what is considered necessary for the regulation
of plumbing, but it would seem that reciprocity could be carried
farther than it has been.
Nearly all the plumbing statutes give certain exemptions.
Here again there is variation, but at the same time general
agreement on certain activities. The licensing acts generally do
not include persons working on water mains and sewers outside
of buildings. 2 They also exclude work done by railroads, pipe
in a letter dated Nov. 27, 1951, stated that New York City does not recog-
nize any license issued by other cities, counties or states.
123. Letter from the R.I. Administrator of Professional Regulation,
Department of Health, to the writer, dated Nov. 14, 1951.
124. Iowa Code Ann. Sen. File 163, § 12 (Legisl, Serv. No. 4, 54th Gen.
Ass., 1951) (licensee in one city may get a license in others without exami-
nation); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7563 (1939). See notes 75, 76 supra, for
the completely confused regulatory scheme in Illinois.
125. ME. REv. STAT. c. 22, § 174 (1944).
126. Wis. STAT. § 145.09 (1951).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 'A, § 116.19 (Supp. Oct. 1951).
128. The Michigan statute allows the state plumbing board to license
without examination persons from other states having licensing require-
ments equivalent to Michigan's but the Director of the State Plumbing
Board, in a letter to the writer dated Nov. 9, 1951, stated that they had
tried to arrange for reciprocity with Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota,
but had not been able to do so. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.458 (1937).
129. See note 49 supra. This exemption is often stated the other way
around in the form of a definition of what is or is not plumbing under the
statute. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3002 (Cum. Supp. 1951) (licensing
not applicable to work done up to and including the meters, where part of
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line companies, mining companies and oil companies on their
own sytsems ;130 work done on farms or rural areas outside the
limits of cities or villages, where there is no public water or
sewer system;131 work done by a property owner in his own
home (although this is by no means a universal exception) .132
There are sometimes exemptions in favor of appliance dealers
who do only enough plumbing to connect the appliance to the
existing water or drainage system.133 Exemptions of this kind
have been upheld.'"'
One different type of exemption which is frequently found
in the statutes is that covering cities or towns with less than
a named population. There is no unanimity as to how large a
city should be before licensing should be applied. In Texas
the statute does not apply in cities of less than 5,000.235 In
Montana the figure is 1,000.1-1 In Louisiana it is 10,000137 In
Tennessee it is 25,000,1,8 although this provision was held dis-
criminatory and unconstitutional by State ex rel. Grantham v.
Memphis."9 The majority of cases hold that the classification
by population is valid, usually on the ground that the smaller
cities do not have complicated water and sewer systems, and that
therefore the danger from defective plumbing is less in the
a system owned and operated by a public service corporation); N.H. REv.
LAws c. 183, § 9 (1942).
130. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-2411 (Cum Supp. 1951); N.M. STAT.
§ 51-3002 (Cum. Supp. 1951); TEx. STAT. REv. Civ. art. 6243-101, (1948).
131. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 /-, § 116.2 (Supp. Oct. 1951); Mn. REV.
STAT. c. 22, § 184 (1944); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3002 (Cum. Supp. 1951);
TEX. STAT. REV. Civ. art. 6243-101 (Supp. 1951); WIs. STAT. § 145.13
(1951).
132. This exemption would not be necessary under many of the statutory
definitions of master or journeyman plumber, which would exclude those
merely doing incidental work on their own homes, not for compensation.
See also ORE. CoMiP. LAWs ANN. § 99-1621 (1940); TEx. STAT. REV. Civ.
art. 6243-101 (1948); Wis. STAT. § 145.13 (1951).
133. This exemption also is one which may be covered by a narrow
definition of plumbing. A few states make it specific. R.I. Pub. Laws 1945-
1946, c. 116, § 31 (exempts sprinkler systems and fire protection appli-
ances). TEX. STAT. REV. Civ. art. 6243-101 (1948).
134. Trewitt v. City of Dallas, 242 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App., 1922);
Ex parte George, 152 Tex. Crim. App. 465, 215 S.W.2d 170 (1945). But
see cases cited in note 166, holding similar provisions invalid as applied to
electricians.
135. TEx. STAT. REv. Civ. art. 6243-101 (1948).
136. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-2401 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
137. LA. Ruv. STAT. tit. 37 § 1376 (1950).
138. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7152 (Williams 1934).
139. 151 Tenn. 1, 266 S.W. 1038 (1994).
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smaller cities.14 To the uninitiated, however, there would seem
to be doubt whether the plumbing found in buildings in a town
of 5,000 is any less complicated than that in a city of 15,000, or
that there is any less danger from defective plumbing in the
smaller town. The economic effect of this type of exemption
is to enable plumbing contractors in larger cities to compete for
business in the smaller towns, and to exclude from competition
in the larger cities plumbing firms who happen to be located in
small towns, thereby giving an unfair competitive advantage
to the city firms.
Partnerships and corporations must of necessity be treated
differently under these licensing statutes. The usual provision
is that a partnership may qualify to do business as a master
plumber by having one active partner who has a master plumb-
er's license.14 ' Likewise a corporation may qualify when one
of its officers gets a license. 42 The requirement is also frequently
140. State ex Tel. Shirley v. Lutz, 226 Ala. 497, 147 So. 429 (1933) (ex-
clusion of countries under 100,000 population held valid, as a legislative, not
a judicial question); Douglas v. People ex Tel. Ruddy, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N.E.
341 (1907) (exclusion of cities under 5,000 population valid since the
smaller cities do not have complicated sewer systems, and little use for
complex plumbing in buildings); State v. Malory, 168 La. 742, 123 So.
310 (1929) (exclusion of cities under 10,000 held reasonable and valid);
Roach v. City of Durham, 204 N.C. 587, 169 S.E. 149 (1933) (not arbitrary
to exclude cities under 3,500 population); Trewitt v. City of Dallas, 242
S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (exclusion of cities under 5,000 valid).
Although the Louisiana statute excludes cities of less than 10,000 from
its state licensing scheme, and that has been upheld, cities smaller than this
may license plumbers, under Town of Pineville v. Simon, 212 La. 540, 33
So.2d 62 (1947). Aside from the kaleidoscopic pattern of licensing that this
produces, it raises the interesting question of how there can be sufficient
need for licensing in these cities to meet constitutional rquirements when
State v. Malory, supra, held they could constitutionally be excluded from
the state's licensing program, because they had no need for protection
against faulty plumbing.
Gregory v. Quarles, 172 Ga. 45, 157 S.E. 306 (1931) held invalid another
exclusion which provided no licenses were needed for work where sewer con-
nections had already been made, but they were required where the connec-
tions were in the process of being made. The court held this had no relation
to public health.
141. The Illinois statute is typical of others. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 111 1 ,
§ 116.5 (Supp. Oct. 1951).
142. Mn. REV. STAT. c. 22 §180 (1944) contains the usual type of pro-
vision: "The board may issue licenses to corporations and partnerships en-
gaged in the plumbing business and applying therefor, provided that one or
more officers or employees of any such corporation directly in charge of the
business affairs of such corporation, or the members of such partnership
directly in charge of the business affairs, apply for the examinations here-




made that any plumbing work engaged in by the partnership or
corporation must be under the direct supervision of a master
plumber.14 In at least two cases this kind of provision has been
held discriminatory and invalid,1 4 because it allows a partner-
ship or corporation to engage in the plumbing business with
only one partner or officer who is licensed, even though the
other partners or officers may be entirely incompetent. In spite
of their incompetence they may jointly carry on business, while
the sole proprietor must always be licensed. This was held
to put an unreasonable burden on the man working alone in
Wisconsin and Tennessee.14 5 As a result the Wisconsin statute
was amended to require that all members of firms, and all
officers of corporations must be licensed.1 46
In one case, by inference at least, such a statutory provision
has been upheld. 147 In many other states it has apparently been
assumed that there is no discrimination, since the provisions
are still in effect and unchallenged, though the more numerous
cases on electricians create some doubt about the matter. 14
In Massachusetts the licensing law makes no provision at
all for partnerships and corporations, and the court has held in
Attorney General v. Union Plumbing Co.'" that, since a partner-
ship or corporation as such cannot take the examination, it
cannot be licensed, and cannot engage in the plumbing business.
The work there was being done under the direct supervision of
a licensed master, who was an officer of the corporation, but
the court held that did not bring it within the statute. This
holding would not seem to prevent a corporation's contracting
to furnish labor and materials, and then subcontracting the
work to a licensed master, however.
143. E.g., CoLO. STAT. ANN. C. 126, § 10 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 111 § 116, 4 (Supp. Oct. 1951); N.D. REV. CODE § 43-1810 (1943); R.I. Pub.
Laws 1945-1946 c. 1661, §9.
144. State ex Tel. Granthan v. Memphis, 151 Tenn. 1, 266 S.W. 1038
(1924); State ex rel. Winkler v. Benzenburg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345
(1898).
145. Ibid.
146. Wis. STAT. § 145.06 (1951): "Each member or employee of a co-
partnership or each officer or employee of a corporation engaging in the
business of superintending plumbing installations shall be required to apply
for and obtain a master plumber's license before engaging in the work of
superintendending plumbing installations."
147. Rountree v. Richmond, 188 Va. 701, 51 S.E.2d 256 (1949).
148. See notes 168, 169, 170 infra.
149. 301 Mass. 86, 16 N.E.2d 89 (1938).
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IV. LICENSING OF ELECTRICIANS
The general technique for licensing electricians is much the
same as that for plumbers, and most of the problems raised are
similar, so that extended discussion would duplicate what has
already been said.
The constitutionality of electricians' licensing statutes is based
on the necessity for fire prevention, rather than public health.
It is uniformly held that such statutes are within the police
power.150 The courts merely say, somewhat perfunctorily, that
faulty electrical installations involve great danger to the public
and that therefore the licensing requirements are valid. The
cases do not raise the question whether the licensing statute
adds any protection to the requirements of electrical permits
and inspection of finished work which are found nearly every-
where.
Although a few states do require a period of experience before
an applicant may take the electricians' examination, the period
is usually shorter than for plumbers. For example the Idaho
requirement is two years' work as an apprentice for eligibility
to become a journeyman, and two years as a journeyman for
eligibility to take the contractors' examination. 151 In Massachu-
setts applicants for either master's or journeyman's licenses
must have had only two years of experience in the installation
of electrical wires, apparatus, etc., under the regulations of
the State Examiners of Electricians.12 A state requiring a
longer period of experience is Minnesota, where the applicant
must show four years' experience for a journeyman's license,
and five years' experience for a master's license.1 3 Apparently
150. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P.2d 72 (1935); Richard-
son v. Coker, 188 Ga. 170, 3 S.E.2d 636 (1939); Berry v. Chicago, 320 I1.
536, 151 N.E. 581 (1926); Town of Pineville v. Vandersypen, 212 La. 521,
33 So.2d 56 (1947); Shreveport v. Bavse, 166 La. 689, 117 So. 775 (1928);
Becker v. Pickersgill, 150 N.J.L. 51, 143 Atl. 859 (1928) ; Toledo v. Winters,
21 Ohio Dec. 171 (1910); Milwaukee v. Rissling, 184 Wis. 517, 199 N.W.
61 (1924), aff'd without opinion, 271 U.S. 644 (1926).
151. IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54, § 54-1004 (1948). This same section re-
quires that the applicant have "at least ten per cent (10%) technical knowl-
edge" before he can become a master electrician. A letter from the Idaho
State Electrical Board to the writer, dated Nov. 19, 1951, indicates that
the administrators of this statute are in considerable doubt about what this
means, and with good reason. There could hardly be a better argument for
legislative drafting services than a meaningless phrase of this kind.
152. Mass. State Examiners of Electricians, Rules for Examinations
(1950).
153. MINN. STAT. § 326.26 (Henderson 1949).
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this does not mean that a man must remain a journeyman five
years before applying for a master's license.
One leading case, City of Tucson v. Stewart,54 deals with the
propriety of these requirements of experience. The city ordinance
provided that a man must be twenty-five years old, and have
six years' experience as a journeyman before he could receive a
master electrician's license. The court held this provision in-
valid, saying that the twenty-five-year age limit was not
thought necessary for the professions and that there was no
reason for it here. It also said that experience as a "practical
electrician" was just as good as experience as a journeyman and
that therefore the other requirement was also invalid. By im-
plication, the case would seem to approve the length of the pe-
riod. Even so, if the case were followed, statutes such as the
Idaho act would be unconstitutional.
The method of examining here is much the same as for plumb-
ers. The examinations cover the electrical codes, electrical
theory, and usually include some practical electrical work. 5 One
case has held that a city ordiance was unconstitutional in re-
quiring a showing before the examining board that the appli-
cant could reasonably be expected to complete his contracts
satisfactorily.Y6 The court conceded that the requirement of a
license was within the city's police power, as a means of lessen-
ing the fire danger, but said that unless the occupation afforded
a greater chance than usual for fraud or diversion of funds, a
regulation aimed only at preventing breach of contract could not
be sustained. This reasoning would invalidate the contractor-
licensing statutes discussed below,'5 7 but the case has not been
cited or relied upon in connection with those statutes.
The examination, to be constitutional, must clearly be con-
cerned with matters related to the business of being an electrical
contractor."8 If the agency administering the licensing is not
given at least some standards, this requirement is not fulfilled." 9
The statute may or may not specify the passing grade, which
154. 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P.2d 72 (1935).
155. See Mass. State Examiners of Electricians, Rules for Examinations(1950).
156. Richardson v. Coker, 188 Ga. 170, 3 S.E.2d 636 (1939).
157. See p. 521 infrTa.
158. Milwaukee v. Rissling, 184 Wis. 517, 199 N.W. 61 (1924), aff'd
without opinion, 271 U.S. 644 (1926).
159. Toledo v. Winters, 21 Ohio Dec. 171 (1910).
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is 70% in Massachusetts.'o In one case, State ex rel. Sill v.
Eaamining Board,'61 the court upheld the denial of a license
where the applicant received a mark of 74.3%, and 75% was
passing, in the face of his contention that the Board, which was
made up entirely of master electricians, had arbitrarily excluded
him. The relator had no evidence to support his claim, and the
members of the Board testified that they had no reason to ex-
clude him. Provision for a specific passing mark may produce
an aura of objectivity about the examination which will prevent
claims of arbitrariness, but as most people who have given and
corrected examinations would agree, the objectivity is often
quite delusive. This case shows how difficult it is for an appli-
cant to prove that the denial of his application was arbitrary.
The examination results shown by Appendix III are somewhat
more uniform for electricians than for plumbers, but the pro-
portion of those passing is still rather low. That may be in part
due to the fact that the experience and training requirements
are less strict for electricians.
The question of exemptions from the electricians' licensing
laws has given trouble in some states. The usual exemptions
cover installation and maintenance of power systems by public
utilities, 62 installation and maintenance of telephone, telegraph
and other communication systems by public utilities,63 work by
the state through its employees,'64 and the replacement of lamps
or fuses, or the installation of other plug-in appliances.15 One
case, Berry v. Chicago,16 6 held that the exemption of public
160. Mass. State Examiners of Electricians, Rules for Examinations(1950).
161. 14 La. App. 17, 129 So. 427 (1930).
162. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54, § 54-1016 (1948); MINN. STAT.§ 326.29 (Henderson 1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-43 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
163. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54 § 54-1016 (1948); MASs. ANN. LAws
c. 141, § 7 (Supp. 1951); N.D. Ruv. ODE § 43-0916 (1943); R.I. Pub. Laws
1941-1942, c. 1234, § 11.2.
164. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT ANN. § 87-43 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
165. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2220 (Cum. Supp. 1951); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 87-43 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
166. 320 Ill. 536, 151 N.E. 581 (1926). Two other cases are in accord.
Southeastern Electric Co. v. Atlanta, 179 Ga. 514, 176 S.E. 400 (1934) is
not properly reported, but it seems to hold that the Atlanta ordinance which
required electricians to get a license, but exempted public utilities, was dis-
criminatory and invalid, for that reason. The case is so explained by
Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949), but there is no
discussion of whether the utilities might properly be exempt because super-
vised by other administrative agencies, or for other reasons. A similar case
is Matill v. City of Chattanooga, 175 Tenn. 65, 132 S.W.2d 201 (1939),
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utilities was discriminatory, in so far as it exempted them with
respect to work done for others, since the classification thereby
made had no reasonable relation to the purposes of the statute.
The court said that as to work done on their own systems the
utilities could properly be excepted from the legislation but that
the danger to the public from the utility wires, transformers and
apparatus would seem to be just as great if not greater than
from the wiring in a private dwelling. The distinction may lie
in the inspection and supervision of the utilities by the state
public service commissions, except that those commissions do
not generally purport to examine public service company per-
sonnel for technical competence. The exemption of utilities thus
leaves a large and important segment of the trade outside the
licensing laws without any very clear reason. The same thing is
done by the plumbing statutes. 1 7
The Berry case also raises the question, discussed in connec-
tion with plumbers,16s whether a statute is unfairly discrimina-
tory which allows a partnership or corporation to engage in
electrical contracting when only one partner or an officer is a
licensed master electrician. The Chicago ordinance there in-
volved phrased the provision in terms of an exemption, saying
that firms were exempt if one member was a qualified electrician.
The court held this discriminatory without much discussion of
the problem. The Tucson" case involved the same problem
and reached the same result on the ground that the ordinance
was unfair to the small single proprietor, since he must get a
license, while a corporation of partnership need not, so long as
one member, who may be inactive, had one, or so long as a
licensed man was employed. The Tucson case is troublesome
because the hardship upon the sole proprietor seems to be the
result of his financial circumstances rather than the discrimina-
tory application of the statute, since he too could operate through
a licensed employee if he could afford it. It would be analogous
to argue that the license fee was unfair because not graduated
which held unconstitutional a statute requiring electrical permits of all but
corporations not rendering electrical services to the general public. The
court said that this distinction was arbitrary, there being no reason why a
corporation should be exempted from the operation of the statute.
167. See notes 129, 134 supra.
168. See notes 144, 145, 147 supra.
169. 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P.2d 72 (1935).
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according to ability to pay. A later case, Sullivan v. Johnson,170
refuses to follow the Tucson decision altogether but does say
that it is* unfair to require the sole proprietor to employ a li-
censed master electrician exclusively, as the object of the statute
could be achieved by merely requiring supervision of the work
by a master electrician, without forcing each contractor to keep a
master electrician in his permanent employ. The court found
that the requirement of permanent employment would obviously
lead to monopoly in favor of the larger firms to the injury or
annihilation of the small business men, all of which was in
violation of the constitution and laws of the state. It would be
difficult to imagine a more unrealistic distinction than the one
the court makes, since if an electrical contractor is to engage in
business it will be no cheaper for him to hire a master electrician
for each job, than to keep one on his permanent staff. The clear
result either under the court's rule, or under the statute as con-
strued, is that the small contractor will have to get a license him-
self.
The membership in electrical boards of examiners is, as in the
case of the plumbing boards, drawn chiefly from the active
members of the trade.371 Massachusetts is exceptional in this
respect, the board being composed of the state fire marshal, the
commissioner of education, the director of civil service, plus one
master electrcian with ten years' experience and one journeyman
with similar experience.172 The example of Massachusetts re-
170. 189 Ga. 778, 7 S.E.2d 900 (1940).171. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54, § 54-1005 (1948) (one master elec-
trician, one journeyman, one employee of the department of law enforce-
ment) ; Md. Acts 1906, c. 244, § 1 (two nominees of the electrical contractors'
association, one nominee of the municipal electrical inspectors one nominee
of the association of fire underwriters, one journeyman); RINN. STAT. §
326.24 (Henderson 1949) (two suppliers of electricity in rural areas, two
master electricians, two journeymen, and one electrical engineer or in-
spector) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2203 (1941) (one representative of electricpublic service companies operating in the state, one electrical contractor,
one representative of a nationally recognized journeyman's organization, one
electrical engineer, one electrical inspector). The presence of a representa-
tive of the utilities on the New Mexico board is interesting in view of the
fact that the licensing statute in that state expressly exempts the utilities.
A similar provision is to be found in the Rhode Island statute. R.I. Pub.
Laws 1941-1942, c. 1234, § 1 (one electrical inspector, one electrical con-
tractor, one journeyman, the superintendent of state police, and one repre-
sentative of electrical utilities).
172. MAss. ANN. LAWS, c. 13, § 32 (1952). See also N.C. GzN. STAT.ANN. § 87-39 (1949) (state electrical engineer, secretary of the state asso-
ciation of electrical contractors, member of the faculty from the University
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futes the contention that such boards must contain a majority of
members of the trade in order to get the benefit of their experi-
ence. North Dakota is another exceptional state in that its
board contains representatives of consumer groups who cer-
tainly have an interest in licensing and who are usually left out
of things entirely. Its board of examiners includes one farmer,
one consumer representative of the rural electric cooperatives,
one licensed master electrician, one licensed journeyman and
one licensed movie machine operator. 73
Licensing boards for electricians therefore are more broadly
representative of the whole community than the plumbers' ex-
amining boards in some states. There seems no reason why, if
the electrical boards can be representative, the plumbing boards
cannot, especially since plumbing is a less complex trade.
One problem arises in connection with electricians which
is not present in the case of plumbers. The electrical trades
are somewhat more specialized than plumbing, and there is
some tendency for the statutes to take this into account. Thus
the North Dakota statute provides for separate examination and
licensing of movie machine operators and rural electricians. 7
4
New York City gives a special electrician's license authorizing
work only on premises of the owner who employs the special
electrician and not covering contract work for others than the
holder's employer.-7 Rhode Island gives a similar license, called
a limited premises license, and also gives an elevator electrician's
license. 76 The problem of specialization becomes more important
in connection with contractor licensing and will be further dis-
cussed below.
V. LICENSING OF CONTRACTORS
The statutes licensing contractors are quite different from
the statutes previously considered. They were a much later
development in the law, the first statute being passed in 1925, in
North Carolina. 177 Their purpose is different, being the protec-
tion of public and building industry from the evils of "cut-
engineering school, one electrical inspector, one representative of an elec-
trical contracting firm).
173. N.D. Rnv. CODE § 43-0902 (1943).
174. N.D. REV. CODE §§ 43-0901, 43-0911, 43-0914 (1943).
175. N.Y. City Administrative Code § B30-4 (Cum. Supp. 1948).
176. R.I. Pub. Laws 1941-1942, c. 1234, § 7.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-1-87-13 (1949).
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throat" or unethical competition,17 rather than from physical
harm as in the plumbing and electrical licensing. They are more
inclusive in one way, since they cover all contractors, but more
limited in another because they do not apply to journeymen or
persons working for wagesY.19 Finally they impose different tests
of fitness, since they require not only examination, but a show-
ing of financial responsibility and good reputation. 180
The purpose of the contractor licensing statutes has been
said to be to provide "an effective and practical protection
against the incompetent, inexperienced, unlawful, and fraudulent
acts of building contractors.""" On that basis the statutes have
been held constitutional by several cases, the one most often
cited being Hunt v. Douglas Lumber Co.2 8 2 The court there re-
lied upon the cases upholding the licensing of physicians to
reach the conclusion that the Arizona statute was a valid exercise
of the police power. One need hardly take the trouble to point
out that there is sufficient difference between the two occupa-
tions to make the physicians' cases less than controlling here.
The court then went on to point out that contractors often
abandon contracts which look unprofitable, divert funds paid
them for the satisfaction of bills for material and labor, and
depart from the terms of their contracts without informing the
owner, all of which causes loss to the owners of property and
to employees. This paper has already pointed out that these
problems do exist in the industry, due to the difficult conditions
under which contracts for building are made, and to the fact
that many contractors are not equipped to cope with those con-
178. A letter from the California Contractors State License Board to the
writer, dated Nov. 7, 1951, stated that "The license law in California was
effective as of 1929 due to the various contracting associations seeing the
need of the public for protection against unscrupulous contractors and the
reputation of their own industry." A letter from the Nevada State Con-
tractors' Board to the writer, dated Nov. 19, 1951, stated "It [the statutel
has done much to free the state of incapable and irresponsible craftsmen.
179. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §71-701 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CALIF.
BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 7026, 7053 (Cum. Supp. 1951); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 87-10 (1949). State v. Mitchell, 217 N.C. 244, 7 S.E.2d 567 (1940)
held that a journeyman plumber need not get a contractor's license.
180. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 46, § 74 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 71-709 (1947); CALIF. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 7065-7069 (Cum. Supp.
1951); NEV. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 1474.24. (Supp. 1941); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-1905 (1941).
181. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 701 (1948).
182. 41 Ariz. 276, 17 P.2d 815 (1933).
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ditions.1 1 The court held that the licensing statute had a rea-
sonable tendency to prevent these evils and was therefore
calculated to protect the public welfare, since a contractor who
had been required to make a showing of good character and
financial responsibility would be less likely to engage in such
practices. Furthermore it said that the provision for revocation
of licenses for certain kinds of misconduct at least minimized
the possibility that the same contractor would indulge in mal-
practices more than once. The Hunt case is weakened as a
precedent by the fact that the court found an alternative ground
for the decision, which makes the discussion of the constitutional
question appear very much like dictum. The case is generally
followed, T4 however, and has recently been approved in Ari-
zona. "'
Of course, as applied to plumbing and electrical contractors,
the licensing of contractors would be supported by the cases
already cited.'" The difficulty is, however, that these statutes
include many other kinds of contractors, as to some of which
there are cases saying licensing is unconstitutional. Thus tkle
California statute applies to painting contractors, 87 and it has
been held that the licensing of painters is not constitutional
because the trade does not unduly endanger public health,
morals or welfare.18 The same is true of mason contractors, 89
heating contractors,' ° and paper hangers.' 9'
There is a possibility of distinguishing the contractor-licensing
statutes with respect to their purpose, which is partly, perhaps
entirely, to protect against pecuniary loss rather than physical
injury, resulting from fraud, breach of contract or poor work-
183. See p. 487, supra.
184. Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 204 P.2d 37
(1949) ; Howard v. State, 85 Cal. App.2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948) ; Alvarado
v. Davis, 115 Cal. App.2d 782, 6 P.2d 121 (1931); Florida ex rel. Reynolds
v. St. Petersburg, 133 Fla. 766, 183 So. 304 (1938); Olsen v. Reese, 114
Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948).
185. Northern v. Elledge, 232 P.2d 111 (Ariz. 1951).
186. See note 23 supra.
187. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 732 (1948).
188. Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246 S.W. 828 (1923).
189. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 732 (1948); Gray v. Omaha, 80 Neb. 526,
114 N.W. 600 (1908); State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170
Pac. 1 (1918).
190. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 732 (1948); Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton,
224 Mich. 564, 195 N.W. 60 (1923).
191. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 732 (1948); Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251,
183 Atl. 534 (1936).
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manship. If this is so, it is more arguable that reputation and
technical ability are relevant subjects of inquiry. In other types
of business it has often been held that the prevention of fraud
or dishonesty or incompetence is a valid reason for the license
requirement, where there is a greater than ordinary opportunity
to harm the public.192 The question then is whether, because of
the practices and conditions in the building industry, there is
sufficient likelihood of pecuniary loss to the public to justify
licensing. The cases seem to assume that this is so, without
any information, the Hunt case for example saying that it "... is
well known to all who have the slightest acquaintance with the
contracting business." 193 This assumes, of course, that the pro-
tection of the contractors themselves from shady competition
would not be enough for constitutionality. No cases have been
found which deal with that problem, but the assumption would
seem to be valid, in view of the premise underlying cases up-
holding licensing, that there must exist some benefit to the
general public, broadly defined, to support the legislation. The
cases which uphold the constitutionality of the so-called Fair
Trade Acts14 might be considered authority for saying that pro-
tection of the contractors as a class from "cutthroat competition"
would be enough to sustain the licensing act, since the Fair
Trade Acts limited the freedom of the buyer of goods to resell
them for what price he pleased, in order to prevent injury to the
owner of the trade-mark, although even there the courts relied
to some extent on injury to the general public."95 At any rate
the resale price maintenance cases would hardly be controlling
authority, since the freedom infringed by the licensing statutes
is more extensive and more important, so as to require a much
stronger showing of corresponding benefit to sustain constitu-
tionality.
One circumstance, not discussed by the courts, is of the great-
est significance for determining the desirability, even the con-
192. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (selling of securities);
Hoblitzel v. Jenkins, 204 Ky. 122, 263 S.W. 764 (1924) (real estate brokers);
Weer v. Page, 155 Ald. 86, 141 Atl. 518 (1928) (banking).
193. 41 Ariz. 276, 286, 17 P.2d 815, 819 (1933).
194. E.g., CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE, § 16900 et seq. (1950). The similar
Illinois statute was held constitutional in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v.
Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
195. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183, 190 (1936).
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stitutional validity, of the contractor-licensing statutes, and
that is the extremely inclusive language which they contain.
The California Act, for example, which has been in force for
some time and has served as a model for other states,196 applies
to contractors who do every conceivable kind of work in, on, or
around buildings, highways, excavations or structures of all
kinds.", Apparently Michelangelo himself, if he had painted
the Sistine Chapel in Los Angeles instead of at Rome, would
have had to get an interior decorator's license. 19 The statute
excludes only certain relatively unimportant work, the sale of
finished products not fabricated into a structure, jobs costing
less than $100, and owners building for their own occupancy.1"9
The constitutional requirement is usually stated to be that the
statute's effects must be reasonably related to its purposes, or
stated another way, that the statute must be reasonably calcu-
lated to accomplish its objectives. It may very well be that there
is a strong likelihood of incompetence, fraud, dispersion of funds,
or breach of contract among general building contractors and
that this may be reduced or eliminated by the requirement of a
license, but can the same be said of cabinet-makers, or electric
sign manufacturers, or elevator manufacturers, or house wreck-
ers, or landscape gardeners, or interior decorators? Yet persons
in all of these businesses must get licenses in California.200 It
196. The Nevada statute was based on the California act. Letter from
the Nevada State Contractors Board to the writer, dated Nov. 19, 1951.
197. CAL. Bus. AND PRoF. CODE, § 7026 (Cum.Supp. 1951) defines "con-
tractor" as "any person, who undertakes to or offers to undertake to or
submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others, construct, alter,
repair' add to subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any building,
highway, road, railroad, excavation or other structure, project, development
or improvement, or to do any part thereof, including the erection of scaffold-
ing or other structures or works in connection therewith. The term con-
tractor includes subcontractor and specialty contractor.
198. MacIntyre v. Angel, 109 Cal. App. 2d 425, 240 P.2d 1047 (1952).
199. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODS, §§ 7053 to 7070 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
200. CAL. ADMiNIS. CODE § 732 (1948) lists the so-called specialty
contractors covered by the act according to the work they perform: boilers,
hot water heating and steam fitting; cabinet and mill work; cement and
concrete; electric signs; electrical (general); elevator installation; excavat-
ing, grading, trenching, paving, surfacing; flooring; glazing; house and
building moving, wrecking; insulation; landscaping; lathing; masonry; orna-
mental metals; painting, decorating, paperhanging; plastering; plumbing;
refrigeration; roofing; sewer, sewage disposal, drain, cement pipe laying;
sheet metal; steel, reinforcing; structural steel; structural post control;
tile; warm-air heating, ventilating, air conditioning; welding; well drilling;
classified specialists.
The Arizona board's classification is equally elaborate. See Ariz. Reg-
istrar of Contractors, Instructions to Applicants for Contractor's License.
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rather looks as though the probability of abuses among a limited
class of persons has been made the excuse for tossing a regula-
tory net over a very much larger, and in many ways entirely
unrelated, heterogeneous class. Here again judicial tolerance
of legislative experiment has meant that the legislature's de-
cision on the desirability and validity of such statutes has been
the final one.
The administration of contractor-licensing statutes is handled
by boards usually composed chiefly or entirely of practicing
contractors. 20 1 An examination of the statutes shows that there
is much less tendency to put persons on the contractor-licensing
boards who are not contractors themselves than is the case with
the plumbing and electrical licensing acts. The California Con-
tractors' State License Board,2 0 2 which seems to be one of the
most thoroughly organized, has seven members, all of whom
must be in the contracting business while in office and must
have been in that business for the five years preceding their
appointment. One member must be a general engineering con-
tractor, three general building contractors, and three specialty
contractors. The Board's statement of its purposes2 3 fails to
explain why the protection of the public must be placed exclu-
sively in the hands of the industry supposedly being regulated.
It is conceivable that a member of the public, or a state official
A case upholding the California act as applied to interior decorators is
Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949).
A recent case discusses the statute as applied to painting contractors,
and concludes that it is entirely valid as a means of preventinF incompetent
workmanship, imposition and deception. The opinion is significant for its
complete failure to mention the freedom to work which was so strongly
emphasized in some of the plumbing cases. Howard v. State, 85 Cal. App.
2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948).
201. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 71-702 (1947) (five practicing con-
tractors, one to be chiefly a highway contractor, one chiefly sewers and
waterworks and one a building contractor); CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE,§§ 7001, 7002 (Cum. Supp. 1951); NEV. CoMoP. LAws ANN. §§ 1474.01,
1474.02 (Supp. 1941) (all seven members to be contractors); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 51-1904 (1941) (one-building contractor, one highway contractor, one
from some other classification); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 87-2 (1949) (one
highway contractor, one public utility contractor, one building contractor) ;
N.D. REV. CODE § 43-0703 (1943) (statute administered by registrar of con-
tractors, who is secretary of state ex officio); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7182-26(Williams 1934) (one sub-contractor and 4 general contractors); UTAH
ODE ANN. § 79-5a-4 (1943) (department of registration issues licenses);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-115 (1950) (one building contractor, one public utility
contractor, one highway contractor, and two others).
202. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 7002 (Cum.Supp. 1951).
203. CAL. ADmINiS. CODE § 701 (1948).
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not a contractor might be able to contribute to the achievement
of the Board's purposes.
The California Board acts through, and supervises, a Regis-
trar of contractors, to whom some of the Board's authority has
been delegated, and who is a full time employee of the state.'"
However, the responsibility for decisions of policy and for the
administration of the act remains with the Board.210
Contractor-licensing statutes apply to persons, partnerships
and corporations, all of which must obtain a license in order to
do business. For some reason provisions for reciprocity between
states are not found here, though the need for them would seem
to be even greater than in the plumbing and electrical trades.
Under most laws, the partnership or corporation must be li-
censed as such, even though the members also hold licenses.2 06
In order to get a license the partnership or corporation must
qualify all of its responsible officers or members as to character
but only its responsible managing member or officer as to experi-
ence, under the California statute.2 07 This provision might be
held discriminatory and unconstitutional, under the cases deal-
ing with similar provisions of the plumbing and electrical licens-
ing laws.' 8
Although the statutes give the licensing boards authority
to require evidence of financial responsibility, of good reputation,
and also to set an examination, 209 it appears that some states
issue licenses automatically upon receipt of the proper applica-
tion form and the required fee. 210 In at least three states, how-
204. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 7011, 7012, 7013, 7065 (Cum.Supp.(1951).
205. CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 7010 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
206. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 71-716 (1947) (one principal must be
licensed and in charge); CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE, § 7026 (Cum.Supp.
1951); NEv. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 1474.09 (Supp. 1949); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-1903 (1941); TENN. CODE ANN. §7182.39 (Williams 1934); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-113 (1950).
207. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 7068, 7069, 7071 (Cum.Supp. 1951).
208. See notes 144, 168, 169, 170 supra.
209. E.g., ARrz. CODE ANN., § 67-2305 (Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 71-708 (1947); CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE, § 7065 (Cum.Supp.
1951); NEv. CoMP. LAWS, § 1474.24 (Supp. 1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-
1905 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 87-10 (1950); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
129 (1950).
210. Letter from the North Dakota Secretary of State to the writer,
dated Nov. 16, 1951; letter from Virginia State Registration Board for
Contractors to the writer, dated Nov. 21, 1951. A letter to the writer from
the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., dated Nov. 30, 1951
referred to the practice of issuing licenses in a routine manner, so that the
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ever, Arizona,21 California,212 and Nevada,213 an investigation
is made of applicants, and examinations are held for some or all
classes of contractors.
The California Board seems to make the most thorough in-
vestigation of applicants. It has statutory power to require such
a showing of experience and knowledge of the "building, safety,
health and lien laws of the State and of the rudimentary ad-
ministrative principles of the contracting business as the board
deems necessary for the safety and protection of the public. '214
The applicant is also required to give a complete statement of
the general nature of his business, on forms supplied by the
registrar, plus other information considered necessary by the
board. 215 The board by its regulations requires four years'
experience within the preceding ten years as journeyman, fore-
man or contractor in the class of contracting for which the
applicant seeks a license.216 School training is counted but may
supply no more than three years of experience. Experience in
excess of the minimum is credited on the examination grade.
The California applicant is also required by statute to "possess
good character,' 2' 7 which is defined by the statute to the extent
that it sets forth certain circumstances which will establish lack
of good character, such as conduct which would justify revoca-
tion of a license; dishonesty, fraud, or deceit; a bad reputation
for honesty and integrity; and conviction for a felony.218 The
board has further defined good character by providing in its
regulations that each applicant must supply three signed refer-
ences on forms prescribed by it from contractors, architects or
engineers licensed in California.2 9 One of these references must
licensing procedure was nothing more than a means of collecting a tax,
and suggested that this did more harm than good, since it misled the public
into thinking that the licensed contractor had passed a test for competence
and responsibility.
211. Letter from the Arizona Registrar of Contractors to the writer,
dated Nov. 2, 1951.
212. Letter from a representative of the California Registrar of Con-
tractors to the writer, dated Nov. 7, 1951.
213. Letter from the Nevada State Contractors Board to the writer,
dated Nov. 19, 1951.
214. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE, § 7068 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
215. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 706 (1948).
216. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE §724 (1948).
217. CAL. Bus. AND PRoF. CODE, § 7069 (Cune. Supp. 1951).
218. Ibid.
219. CAL. ADMINIS. CODE § 709 (1948).
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be from a licensed contractor in the classification in which thd
applicant wishes to be licensed. The least that can be said of
this method of establishing "character" is that it contains un-
limited potentialities for abuse without having any correspond-
ing benefits. It places in the hands of an applicant's competitors
the power to prevent his entrance into the business by refusing
him a letter of recommendation. There is no reason why, if
the purpose of the letter is to establish good reputation, any
impartial persons in the community could not provide the neces-
sary information about an applicant.2 0 No one would contend
that contractors are the only competent judges of "character" in
California. It is true that the form letters of reference carry
also a statement about the applicant's experience, but that can
be established far better by a detailed account from the applicant
himself and by the examination. One can only suspect that this
requirement is an exclusionary device in disguise. In fact it seems
questionable whether any such general "character" evidence is
worth the paper it is written on, in view of the difficulty of
defining just what it is that the applicant must show.
The California act contains an important safeguard against
misuse of the rather vaguely defined qualifications for a license
in its provision that, if information is brought to the attention
of the registrar of such a nature as to justify denying a license
on the ground of lack of good character or integrity, the regis-
trar must notify the applicant and grant a hearing in accordance
with the state administrative procedure act, from the decision
in which proceedings for judicial review may be taken.221
The elaborate classifications found in the California and
Arizona administrative regulations imply separate and different
examinations for some or all of the branches of the trade. In
both states all applicants must take written examinations, and
for some classifications specific written examinations are
220. The New Mexico statute requires references from two reputable
citizens of the county in which the applicant resides. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-1905 (1941). The Nevada board requires references from eight indivi-
duals, two each from engineers, from building supply firms, from banks,
lending or bonding institutions, and from persons for whom the applicant
has done construction work. Nevada State Contractors Board Rules, Art.
II, § 1(u) (1951).
221. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. COD, § 7073 (Cum. Supp. 1951). A similar
provision is found in the New Mexico act, which provides for a decision by
an advisory committee of three reputable residents of the county. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 51-1905 (1941).
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given.22 2 The classification and examination scheme also involves
a license to engage in a particular branch of the business, al-
though in California at least, a contractor may do work outside
his classification if it is incidental or supplemental to a contract
which falls within his classification. 2 23 In other states apparently
only a general license for all kinds of contracting is given.22 4
There are objectionable features to both types of statute. If a
general license is given and an examination required, a contrac-
tor may be examined in fields where he possesses no knowledge
and in which he has no intention of doing business.225 On the
other hand an excessive classification may limit a contractor's
freedom to take jobs slightly outside his field which he might
be willing and competent to take if not subjected to the necessity
of getting another license. This might very well lead to a limit-
ing of competition among contractor as the classification became
more rigid.
The importance of contractor-licensing statutes is diminished
in some states by extensive exemptions. A fairly high cost
exemption is found in many statutes226 so that smaller contrac-
tors doing relatively low-cost jobs need not be licensed. It is
not unusual to find an exemption for owners building on their
own property,2 2 7 although in California this exemption is limited
222. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2305 (1939); Letter from Arizona Registrar
of Contractors to the writer, dated Nov. 2, 1951; CAL. ADmINIS. CODE §§
760,764 (1948).
223. CAL. ADmiNIS. CODE § 760 (1948).
224. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 7182.35 (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 79-5a-4 (1943).
225. This difficulty is discussed in Silverman, Bennett, Lechliter, Control
by Licensing Over Entry into the Market, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234,
251 (1941). The authors refer to the New Mexico statute as open to this
objection, but it seems to contemplate the classification of contractors and
their examination only in fields where they are competent. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51-1905, 51-1917 (1941).
226. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 71-701 (1947) ($10,000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 87-1 (1950) ($15,000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7084-1 (1942)
($12,500); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7182.35 (Williams 1934) ($10,000); VA.
CODEANN. § 54-113 (1950) ($20,000).
The cost limit is much lower in states copying the California act: ARIZ.
CODE ANN. § 67-2303 (Supp. 1951) (no limit); CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE§ 7048 (Cum. Supp. 1951) ($100); NEv. Comop. LAws ANN. §§ 1474.13-
1474.21 (Cum. Supp. 1951) (no limit); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1902 (Cum.
Supp. 1951) (no limit); UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-5a-2 (1943) ($200).
227. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2303 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. BUS. AND
PROF. CODE § 7044 (Cum. Supp. 1951). Moon v. Goldstein, 69 Cal. App. 2d
800, 158 P.2d 1004 (1945) held that an owner of property who subdivided it
and put up thirty houses on it was within the licensing statute.
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to cases where the owner intends to, and does occupy the prop-
erty himself, and does not offer it for sale before completion.
This exemption seems difficult to square with the supposed pur-
poses of the statute, since an owner may build, live in the house
a short time and then sell, without getting a license, but if he
does not live in the house he must get a license or hire a licensed
contractor. The possible harm to the public would be that he
might do a shoddy job and sell to an unsuspecting buyer, or
might not pay his laborers, but that harm can occur just as
well whether he lives in the house himself or not, and the distinc-
tion made by the licensing statute has therefore little relation to
the prevention of such harm.
Other exemptions frequently found are for work by public
utilities L2s work incident to the discovery or production of oil,229
work by irrigation districts,23- activities of persons merely fur-
nishing materials without incorporating them into buildings,31
and persons working solely as employees for wages.2 32
As is the case with other licensing statutes, the unlicensed
contractor faces not only the sanction of criminal penalties2 33
but also the likelihood that the courts will refuse to allow him to
recover for work and materials,23 4 although in one case the Cali-
228. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2303 (CuM. Supp. 1951); CAL. Bus. AND
PROF. CODE § 7042 (Cum. Supp. 1951); NLT. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 1474.15
(Supp. 1941); UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-5a-2 (1943).
229. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2303 (CuM. Supp. 1951); CAL. BUS. AND
PROF. CODE § 7043 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
230. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2303 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. BUS. AND PROF.
CODE § 7049 (CuM. Supp. 1951) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-5a-2 (1943).
231. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2303 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. BUS. AND PROF.
CODE § 7045 (Cum. Supp. 1951); NEv. COMP, LAws ANN. § 1474-17 (Supp.
1941).
232. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 7053 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
233. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 46, §77 (1940); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-2319
(Cum. Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 71-713 (Cum. Supp. 1951);
CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 7028, 7029, 7030 (Cum. Supp. 1951); NET.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 1474.32 (Supp. 1949); N.M. STAT. § 51-1914 (1941);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 87-13 (1950); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7084-4 (1942);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7182.37 (Williams Cum. Supp. 1952); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 79-5a-10 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-128 (1950).
234. Three states have specific statutory provisions on this point, ARIZ.
CODE ANN. § 67-2320 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE, § 7031
(Cure. Supp. 1951); NEV. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 1474.32A (Supp. 1949),
requiring that he plead and prove he was licensed as a condition to any
recovery of compensation.
Several cases have dealt with the same doctrine. Sheble v. Turner, 46
Cal. App. 2d 762, 117 P.2d 23 (1941) (plaintiff could not enforce a contract
under which he was to act as owner's agent in getting plans, mortgages and
supervising construction of houses, letting subcontracts and assisting in the
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fornia court seems to have tempered the operation of the statute
by "construction" to some extent. 235
Revocation of contractors' licenses is usually provided for,
either upon the verified complaint of a private person or upon
the initiative of the administrative agency. 236  Some of the
grounds for revocation given by the California statute, which
is typical, are abandoment of a project without excuse,2 37 diver-
sion of funds,2 38 wilful departure from or disregard of specifica-
tions, 2 9 wilful disregard of building laws, 240 failure to keep
records required by law,241 misrepresentation of a material fact
in getting a license,242 loaning one's license,243 any wilful or
fraudulent act causing injury to another,244 wilful failure to
sale of the buildings, since plaintiff was acting as a contractor without a
license); Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal. App. 2d 233, 196 P.2d 585 (1948) (an
unlicensed contractor could not foreclose a mechanic's lien); Franklin v.
Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal. 2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949) (interior
decorators could not recover for decorating an office without a license, even
in a proceeding to confirm the award of arbitrators) ; Olsen v. Reese, 114
Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948) (plaintiff, a contractor, could not recover for
his services when he did not get a license until after the contract was made,
though before most of the work was done). But in Norwood v. Judd, 93
Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949) the court allowed one partner to get
an accounting from another, though the firm had not had a contractor's
license.
Welles v. Revercomb, 189 Va. 777, 54 S.E.2d 878 (1949) allowed an un-
licensed contractor to recover, on the ground that the licensing statute was
a tax, not a police regulation, but the court entirely overlooked the Virginia
licensing act.
235. Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265(1946) (partnership allowed to recover on a contract although unlicensed
when both individuals were licensed contractors, and both were members o?
another firm which was licensed, but as Edmonds, J., dissenting, pointed out,
this result was directly contrary to the literal words of the statute).
236. ALA CoDE ANN. tit. 46, § 75 (1940); ARIz. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2312,
67-2313, 67-2314, 67-2315, 67-2316 (Cum. Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 71-711 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE, §§ 7090,
7091, 7095, 7100, 7102 (Cum. Supp. 1951); NEv. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
1474.25 (Supp. 1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-1909, 51-1909a (Cum. Supp.
1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 87-11 (1950); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7084-3(1942); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7182.34 (Williams Cum. Supp. 1952); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 79-5a-6 (1943) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 54-132 (1950).
237. CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 7107 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
238. Id. § 7108.
239. Id. § 7109.
240. Id. § 7110. Barry v. Contractors State License Board, 85 Cal. App.
2d 600, 193 P.2d 979 (1948) (registrar validly revoked license for violation
of the building code and could condition reissue of license on rebuilding of
the defective structure).
241. CAL. Bus. AND PROP. CODE § 7111 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
242. Id. § 7112.
243. Id. §§ 7114, 7117.
244. Id. § 7116.
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carry on a job with reasonable diligence,24 1 wilful failure to pay
money due for materials or labor .2 4 The revocation procedure
is governed by the state administrative procedure act,24 7 and
includes a hearing before the agency248 and the right of judicial
review. 49
As an additional protection to the public, some of the licensing
statutes provide for the giving of a bond as a condition upon
the grant of the license. The bond secures the proper per-
formance of the contractor's projects and the payment for labor
and materials.2 5
There is one other type of contractor licensing statute, found
only in a few western states, notably Idaho,251 Montana 5 2 and
North Dakota, -5 3 providing for the licensing of contractors doing
work for the state or its subdivisions. These statutes are ad-
ministered to a considerable extent like the general contractor-
licensing acts, and a showing of financial responsibility and ex-
perience must be made to the administering agency. They are
really only a more formal expression of the very common re-
quirement that before bidding on state construction jobs a con-
tractor must "prequalify," that is, furnish information about his
financial condition, his equipment, and his experience.
2 5 4
VI. LICENSING OF OTHER TRADES
There have been scattered and sporadic attempts to obtain
licensing statutes applicable to trades other than those of plumb-
ers and electricians, but they have not been successful. Some
have been held unconstitutional, such as those licensing mason
contractors,255 painters,25 6 and paper hangers.257 In one instance
245. Id. § 7119.
246. Id. § 7120.
247. Id. § 7091.
248. CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE §§ 11503-11523 (Cure. Supp. 1951).
249. CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 11523 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
250. E.g., NEV. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 1474.26a (Supp. 1949).
251. IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54, §§ 54-1901-54,1924 (1947).
252. MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §§ 84-3501-84-3512 (1947).
253. N.D. REv. CODE §§ 43-0701-43-0718 (1943).
254. This is often required by regulation of the state highway department.
See also Mich. Pub. Acts 1933, Act No. 170; Ore. Laws 1931, c. 225, Wash.
Sess. Laws 1937, c. 53.
255. Gray v. Omaha, 80 Neb. 526, 114 N.W. 600 (1908); State ex 'rel.
Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 Pac. 1 (1918).
256. Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246 S.W. 828 (1923). Apparently
the painters tried and failed to obtain passage of a licensing statute in
Illinois. Hearings, supra note 74, at 5255.
257. Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534 (1936).
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the licensing of plasterers was upheld on the ground that the
business was "fraught with the possibility of danger to the
physical well-being of the public.'2518 In any event it does not
appear likely that licensing statutes will be extended to other
trades, especially since the licensing of contractors has been
so inclusive in some states that the demand for licensing from
the employers' sector of the trades has been satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSION
A study of licensing in the building industry makes at least
one fact reasonably clear: the licensing acts would neither have
been passed nor upheld in the courts without both (1) recogni-
tion of the existence of certain evils in the industry and (2)
the active influence of trade association and labor unions.21o It
would be a great over-simplification to say, therefore, either
that the statutes were passed solely for the protection of the
public or solely as the result of lobbying by interested groups.
The evils referred to here include the danger to public health
of defective plumbing and the fire danger from faulty wiring,
but they also include complex economic and social facts which
have probably been more significant in getting the legislation
passed than considerations of health or fire-prevention. Risks
to health and safety have of course been influential with the
courts in their decisions on the constitutionality of these statutes,
but even here they have not been indispensable, as witness the
approval of contractor licensing, where no such risks are in-
volved. The social significance of these statutes is that they
make a profession out of what was formerly a trade,2C0 thereby
increasing the prestige of its practitioners.
The more important effects of licensing are economic. As
applied to plumbing and electrical journeymen, it prevents the
influx of untrained, casual labor which might very well occur
258. State ex Tel. Remick v. Clousing, 205 Minn. 296, 285 N.W. 711 (1939).
There was testimony before the TNEC to the effect that the plasterers had
attempted to get a similar statute through the Illinois legislature but had
been unsuccessful. Hearings, supra note 74, at 5256.
259. The California act was the outcome of contractors' association
activity. Letter from California Registrar of Contractors to the writer
dated Nov. 7, 1951. The New Mexico plumbing licensing statute was actively
sponsored by the local journeymen's union. Letter from the New Mexico
Plumbing Administrative Board to the writer dated Nov. 23, 1951.
260. See Fellman, A Case Study in Administrative Law-The Regulation
of Barbers, 26 WAsi. U.L.Q. 213, 225 (1941).
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without it in periods of labor shortage and high wages. In
an industry which is so subject to both seasonal and cyclical
fluctuation in employment, the likelihood of competition for
jobs from unskilled men wishing to take advantage of the high
wages is particularly great. The fact that the plumbing and
electrical licensing acts, which have been the subject of legisla-
tive action for over fifty years, are usually passed in times of
relative prosperity bears this out. At those times the high
wages in the construction trades would naturally attract many
men who, in the absence of licensing statutes, might be able
to pick up enough facility in the trade in a short time to compete
for jobs with those who had been working in it for years. The
effect of their activities would probably be lower wages all
round and inferior work. The opportunity for this competition
by untrained men was increased by the decline in the degree of
skill required by the trades and by the lack of an organized
apprenticeship program which was not remedied until recently.
A well organized system of apprenticeship is important not
only as a means of recruiting men for the trade but also as a
means of insuring that entry into the trade will only be via the
apprenticeship. In the absence of an apprenticeship program
and of complete unionization, licensing was thus hit on as a use-
ful device for curing the evils of unrestricted competition.
As applied to contractors, plumbing, electrical and all other
varieties, licensing had a similar purpose. In the conditions of
the business, the small inefficient contractor was a disturbing
force because of his proclivity to low bidding and all its con-
sequences of inferior work, violation of specifications, abandon-
ment of contracts, and sometimes bankruptcy. Licensing sta-
tutes were aimed at the elimination of this type of contractor
and these types of abuse. Here again the argument is that un-
restricted competition cannot be tolerated because it lowers
price below what is necessary for good work, drives out re-
sponsible contractors, and produces inferior building and
financial loss. This amounts to saying that contracting is such
a difficult business, requires such expert knowledge and financial
strength, that free entry into it is not for the best interests of
the public and that competition is not an effective regulator
of the market under those conditions. This is presumably what
the proponents of the legislation mean when they say that they
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wish to prevent unethical, fraudulent or cutthroat competition.
Similar arguments have been successfully made on behalf of
the resale price maintenance statutes.
That these statutes do restrict competition to some extent can
hardly be denied. Various agencies of the federal government
have indicated their conviction that they do.2 0 1 The question then
is whether that restriction is over-balanced by the good effects
of licensing. It is the writer's opinion that it is not, and that
the industry's difficulties could be removed by measures short
of such a drastic limitation on the freedom to choose an occupa-
tion.262 The dangers from faulty work could be largely elimi-
nated by adequate permit and inspection schemes. Unionization
and apprenticeship protect the journeymen from the competition
of unskilled men. The contractors could be as well protected by
a registration system as by licensing, and then entry into the
business would not be so difficult and newcomers could compete
on more even terms. But this opinion is of little importance,
since it appears that licensing is firmly established as a means of
control in the building industry.
The important question is, given the purposes of the statute,
261. Heaings, supra note 74, at 5150 (testimony by Thurman Arnold to
the effect that licensing and registration of contractors are legislative re-
straints on trade). The Federal Works Administrator has made regulations
covering work done by states with federal funds as follows: "No procedure
or requirement shall be approved which, in the judgment of the Adminis-
trator, is designed or may operate to prevent the submission of a bid by, or
the award of a contract to, any responsible contractor, whether resident or
nonresident of the state wherein the work is to be performed, such as laws
or regulations which require the licensing of a contractor before he may
submit a bid or which prohibit the consideration of a bid submitted by a
contractor not so licensed ... ." 23 CODE FED. RBns. § 1.10(d) (1949)
This regulation was made under 52 STAT. 636 (1938), 23 U.S.C. §8a (1950);
providing for approval of methods of bidding only where they would "be
effective in securing competition." A case holding that a license cannot be
required for bidding on a federal project is Lee Moor Contracting Co. v.
Hardwicke, 56 Ariz. 149, 106 P.2d 332 (1940).
On the other hand a letter from the Research and Education Director,
National Electrical dontractors Association, to the writer, dated Dec. 28
1951, expresses the view that on the whole the expansion of the electrical
contracting industry is not impeded by licensing and examination require-
ments.
262. Even the drastic licensing provisions may not be entirely adequate
to their objectives. In the letter referred to supra note 261, the statement
is made that most licensing and examination requirements are such that
persons with limited experience can pass, if they have worked as electricians
for any time at all, and that it :has proved quite difficult to test their quali-
fication for larger, more complicated jobs, and also to test their competence




whether they may be accomplished by a licensing scheme which
minimizes the impairment of economic freedom and the possibili-
ties of abuse. The writer believes that this question can be
answered in the affirmative. A great deal can be done to improve
the technique of licensing. The statutes are open to the objec-
tion, which can usually be addressed to legislation in which
only the members of a special class are interested, that it does
not take account of the interests of all persons to be affected
but only of the interests of the particular class. In order to cure
this defect, the following specific changes in the licensing sta-
tutes are sugested:
(1) All licensing should be done by the states rather than
municipalities, or, in the alternative, any city's license should
be valid without further formality in all other places in the
same state. Similarly all states should provide for reciprocal
action on licenses from other states. These reforms would pre-
vent entirely gratuitous restrictions on the mobility of the in-
dustry.
(2) The statutes should be administered by an agency in the
full-time employ of the state, having no outside business inter-
ests, and responsible only to the state. Members of the trade
to be licensed, if on the board at all, should be in the minority.
The persons on the board should have expert knowledge of the
trade with which they deal.
(3) In order to make the licensing procedure as objective as
possible, all "character," or reputation tests should be aban-
doned. They help very little in discriminating between the fit
and the unfit and are capable of abuse. Contractors could as
well be licensed after presenting a statement of experience and
a financial statement. The examination would still give wide
discretion to the administering agency, but that appears un-
avoidable.
(4) Training and experience requirements should be made at
least as short, probably shorter, than the apprenticeship period
and of course should be uniform throughout the state.
(5) Exemptions based on the population of cities should be
abandoned. All persons active in a business enterprise should
be required to have a license, whether they operate in the form
of a partnership or a corporation or as a sole proprietorship.
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(6) In the case of contractors, the application of the licensing
act should be limited to plumbers, electricians, and general
contractors and builders. There appears to be no reason for
requiring a license of the myriad of businesses covered by the
California law. Journeymen licensing should be limited to
plumbers and electricians.
It is quite possible that with these changes, or even part of
them, licensing would not be acceptable to the persons affected
by it, but they would seem to be the minimum necessary to
protect both public and industry.
Licensing statutes are typical of the industrial organization
of society common in twentieth-century America. Under them a
person's status determines his rights in the most important
activity of his life, his work. The status involved is membership
in an industrial group and is obtained not through the accident
of birth but by compliance with a statute or action of an ad-
ministrative body. The importance of attaining this status
makes entry into the group the point at which decisive legal
control can be conveniently exercised, but its convenience should





Table showing the dates on which the various states first required licenses for work-
ing in the building industry. The dates given are those on which the licensing method
now used, namely state or municipal examination, was first adopted. Of course many
































New Mexico ................ 1949
N.Y . ..........................
N.C. -.-.----.................... 1931
N.D...... ........ ......... 1941
Ohio . ......... ... .....
Okla . ... ........... ......
Ore . ......... .. ....... 1935
Penn. .......................




Tex . ----....... ........... 1947
Utah ............................ 1937
Vt. ...............................
Va . ...... ..................
W ash . .........................
W .Va. ....................
W is ................ 1931




















































Septic tank cleaners 1951
Steamfitters 1937
Well drillers 1947
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APPENDIX II
A. Statutes authorizing the licensing of plumbers:
ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3101-3714 (Supp. 1951); CAL. HEALTH AND,
SAFLTY CODE §§ 800-811 (Supp. 1951); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 126, §§ 1-2a
(1935); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 634 (1949); D.C. CODE §§ 1401-1408
1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.01-469.07 (Cum. Supp. 1950); Ga. Laws
1937, No. 426, p. 748, as amended by Ga. Laws 1939, No. 229, p. 355;
ILL. REV. STAT. c. 111 1h, §§ 116.1-116.35 (1951); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 368
(1949); Ky. Rzv. STAT. §§ 318.010-318.990 (1948); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 37,
§§ 1361-1376 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. c. 22, §§ 162-186 (1944); MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAWS art. 43, §§ 318-325 (1939); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 142, §§
1-11 (1932), MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 13, § 36 (Cum. Supp. 1950); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14.451-14.486 (Cum. Supp. 1949); MINN. STAT. §§ 326.37-326.45
(CuM. Supp. 1951); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7560-7567, §§ 15659.1-15659.14
(Supp. Sept. 1951); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-2101 to 11-2111 (Cum.
Supp. 1951); NEn. REv. STAT. §§ 19-301 to 19-314 (1943); N.H. REV. LAWS
c. 183, §§ 1-11 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, c. 3, § 31.1e (1940), tit. 40, c.
49, §5.1 (1940), tit. 26, c. 3C, § 2 (Supp. 1951); N.M. STAT ANN. §§ 51-3001
to 51-3021 (Cum. Supp. 1951); N.Y. General City Law §§ 40-47, N.Y.
Town Law 136(7); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-16 to 87-27 (1950); N.D. REV.
CODE §§ 43-1801 to 43-1824 (1943) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 3637 (1938) ;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §§ 451-458 (1951); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 99-1610
to 99-1623 (1940); Ore. Laws 1947, c. 331, p. 472; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§§ 2551-2558, §§ 4071-4082 (Cum. Supp. 1950); R.I. Pub. Laws 1945-1946,
c. 1661, pp. 295-311, R.I. Pub. Laws 1947-1948, c. 2122, p. 984, R.I. Pub.
Laws 1947-1948, c. 2136, p. 1009; S.C. CODE, §§ 7146-7151 (1942); S.D.
CODE § 45.0201(64) (1942); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7152-7182 (Williams
1934); TEx. STAT. Rmx. Civ. art. 6243-101 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
79-14-1 to 79-14-17 (1943); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 591(72) (1949); Wis.
STAT. §§ 145.01-145.13 (1949); Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 29-313 (1945).
B. Statutes authorizing the licensing of electricians:
CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 3684 (1949); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 84, c. 84-IA
Note (Cure. Supp. 1951), Ga. Acts Ex. Sess. 1937-1939, p. 327, Ga. Laws
1943, p. 481, Ga. Laws 1941, p. 57; IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54, §§ 54-1001 to
54-1018 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 24, § 23-95 (1942); Md. Acts 1906, c.
244; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 141, §§ 1-10, (Supp. 1951), MASS. ANN. LAWS c.
13, § 32 (Supp. 1951), MINN. STAT. §§ 326.24-326.32 (1949), M Iinn. Sess.
Laws 1951, c. 475, c. 571; Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14942-14944 (Cun. Supp.
1950); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-2201 to 51-2219 (1941); N.Y. General City
Law § 27, N.Y. Town Law § 136(7); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-39 to 87-51
(1950); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 43-0901 to 43-0923 (1943), N.D. Laws 1949, c.
287; OHIO GEN. CODE § 3637 (1938); ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 112-609 to
112-619 (1940), Ore. Laws 1949, c. 83; R.I. Pub. Laws 1941-42, c. 1234, pp.
776-785, R.I. Pub. Laws 1943-1944, c. 1381, p. 269, R.I. Pub. Laws 1949-
1950, c. 2270, pp. 370-374; S.D. CODE § 45.0201(64) (1942); WASH. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8307-1 to 8307-18 (1932); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 591(72)
(1949).
C. Statutes authorizing the licensing of contractors:
ALA. CODE ANN. tit 46, §§ 65-82 (1940); AnRiz. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2301
to 67-2326 (Cum. Supp. 1951) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 71-701 to 71-720
(Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 7000-7145 (Cum. Supp.
1951); IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 54, §§ 54-1901 to 54-1924 (1947); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-1408 (Burns 1950); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 84-3501 to
84-3512 (1947); NEV. ComP. LAWS §§ 1474.01-1474.35 (Supp. 1049); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51-1901 to 51-1916 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-1 to
87-13 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 43-0701 to 43-0718 (1943); S.C. CODE §§
7084-1 to 7084-7 (1942), S.C. Acts and Joint Resolutions 1949, No. 208, pp.
324, 325, 326; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7182.25-7182.42 (Williams 1941) ; UTAH
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CODE ANN. §§ 79-5a-1 to 79-5a-ll (1943); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-113 to
54-145 (1950).
D. Statutes authorizing the licensing of miscellaneous trades:
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 24, §§ 22-43 to 22-48 (1942) (mason contractors);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.434(1) -14.434(7) (Supp. Sept. 1951) (septic tank
cleaners); MINN. STAT. §§ 326.46-326.52 (1949) (steamfitters); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 87-28 to 87-37 (1950) (tile contractors).
APPENDIX III
The following tables give some idea of how many persons pass the various examina-
tions for license, out of those who take them. The figures were obtained through the
kindness of the administrative agencies concerned, and should be considered as only
approximate. They all cover a one year period, but some are actual figures for one
year and others are an average. The figures for the bar examinations were taken
from The Bar Examiner for the month of July, 1951, and relate to the 1950 bar exami-
nations.
(1) Plumbers:





Kentucky 300 70 54-February
62-June
Maine 115-Journeymen 34-Journeymen 59-February
118-Masters 35-Masters
Michigan 700 70 69-April
64-September
N.Y. City 10-15 (Written)* 44-March**
50 (Practical)* 50-June
51-October
New Mexico 250-Journeymen 40-Journeymen 66-May
140-Masters 30-Masters 79-August
Wisconsin 251-Journeymen 80-Journeymen 73
80-Masters 54-Masters
* In New York City both a written and practical test is given, but both must be
passed, so that presumably the lower figure here is the one which controls those
licensed.
Bar examinations for New York State.
(2) Electricians:
State Number Taking Examinations %Passing % Passing Bar
Maryland 40 to 100 25-30 46-March
57-July
Massachusetts 1472-Journeymen 32-Journeymen 20-July
313-Masters 37-Masters 51-December
North Carolina 439 25 76
North Dakota 300 54 100-May
65-August
(3) Contractors: The only figures obtainable were from California.
California 8,043 (1949-50) 64 (1949-50) 38-April
4,921 (1950-51) 60 (1950-51) 53-October
The following proportions passed the examinations in the various specialty exanina-
tions in California: Electrical 55%; House moving 42%; Masonry 45%; Roofing 53%;
Tile 48%.
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